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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Throughout my life I have been extremely blessed with the opportunity to build
relationships with people of diverse religious and non-religious backgrounds. Some of
my closest friends, family and colleagues are atheist, agnostic, or religious/spiritual folk
who have left the church and self-identify as “non-religious.” These loved ones, contrary
to the assumptions of many, are generally very supportive of my decision to go to
seminary and open to discussing religious and philosophical themes. I have found it odd,
therefore, that so many of my religious loved-ones and even fellow seminarians doubt the
extent to which non-religious persons can articulate meaning in their lives. More
shocking than this is the occasional remark that doubts the ethical grounding of nonreligious persons and suggests that religious people (in this case, Christian people) are
more capable and better prepared to “do good” than those without formal religious
conviction. Even amidst interfaith circles, I often hear stated that we-religious-people
have to come together to “fight against secularism” without much thought as to what the
word “secular” actually means to those who identify as such, not to mention the irony
that people of faith would “fight against” an entire segment of people because of what
they believe and how they articulate meaning. Unfortunately, I have been equally
disappointed with the exaggerations and misconceptions about religious persons
purported by my non-religious loved ones, some of whom continue to hold onto negative
and over-simplistic stereotypes of religion and religious persons, viewing me as an
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admitted “exception to the rule.” They see overtly religious people as close-minded,
oppressive, and themselves weak examples of those who “do good.”
As I listen to the stories of the religious and non-religious, however, I can
appreciate the reasons they give for making the conclusions they do about “the other
side” (indeed, I too hold strong opinions about the religious and non-religious extremism
that they often mention). More often than not, their concerns are legitimate and should
not be ignored for the sake of artificial “togetherness.” These apprehensions, however,
mask the great potential that each group has to contribute to meaning-making and the
pursuit of good. I am convinced that the religious and non-religious have more in
common than they realize, even whilst maintaining significant differences, and could
benefit greatly from both hearing each other out regarding each other’s perspectives on
issues such as ethics, religion and spirituality and finding ways to collaborate, for their
own sake and the sake of others and the pursuit of justice. This, I maintain, is made
possible through intentional dialogue. It is with this conviction that I began my research,
hoping to better understand the complex relationship between the religious and nonreligious and how they could come together in positive ways. Unfortunately, I was not
prepared for the contentious conversation between the religious and non-religious that
was already at play.
While my own personal experience with dialogue between the religious and nonreligious has generally been a positive one, my preliminary research into the topic
surfaced a slew of examples that indicated that the opposite was the case for many others.
The religious and non-religious, it seemed, were at intense odds with each other. News
articles, broadcasts, and online blogs all confirmed this reality. Each “side” was angry,
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full of accusations, and eager to prove a point. As my investigation continued, my view
of the situation grew dim and I began to fear that dialogue was of no interest to those
whose commentary filled my research. One can be easily deceived by public, popular
media, however, and as I continued to follow what appeared to be a bleak pursuit, I
discovered that there were indeed many religious and non-religious individuals and
groups that did in fact want to be in dialogue. The problem was that those who promoted
positive dialogue efforts did not usually dominate the most easily-viewed venues of
conversation, i.e., online posts and televised debates.
Those that did promote affirmative dialogue experiences were behind the scenes,
some actively seeking dialogue as a vocational pursuit and others taking a more cautious
step towards dialogue, desiring the opportunity but feeling unqualified or unaware of how
to participate in such a conversation. If these dialogue advocates did participate in online
conversations, they were usually the minority and their reasoned, hopeful words of
wisdom were often drowned out by the more dramatic, visceral commentary of loud
naysayers. Many of those who wanted to engage in dialogue with friends, family or
acquaintances felt unprepared and either avoided the conversation all together or found
themselves having a debate rather than a dialogue. Even those attempting to partner with
the most progressive dialogue circles, including proponents of interfaith dialogue, were
met with hesitation by both the religious and non-religious alike who argued that those
with no faith had no part to play in inter-faith. Despite these challenges, the religious and
non-religious continue to have a deep desire to engage in productive, positive dialogue
with each other, whether or not it is called “interfaith” or not. Some have made incredible
strides towards this pursuit and have much to teach us. Many, however, continue to lack
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the articulation, language, and methods needed to put their hope for constructive
conversation into action.
Contributing to the obstacles that impede the implementation and promotion of
dialogue between the religious and non-religious is the general cluelessness about the
history and terminology that already surrounds the conversation. Quite often, it seems,
those engaging in dialogue or debate do so with little knowledge of the intimate
relationship that previously and currently exists between religious and non-religious
worldviews, religion and secularization, and the sacred and the secular. These terms are
spoken of as opposing, separate phenomena that compete with one another when they are
in fact—as will later be demonstrate—deeply connected and dependent on one another.
Religion, for example, has at many times been a secularizing force. The secular sphere, in
turn, has created a space for unchained articulation of new religious expression. What one
considers in one time to be sacred may at another time be deemed as belonging to the
secular world. What was once defined in religious terms may in turn be defined in secular
terms, while still maintaining a transcendental quality and retaining a religious meaning
for some. This does not mean that the religious and non-religious are the same, or that
their worldviews cannot be given individual and separate consideration—but it would be
erroneous to say that they are not related, or in my own growing estimation, incredibly
co-dependent.
To accept that the religious and non-religious are co-dependent may not be a
necessary conclusion to make in order to enter into positive dialogue experiences—
indeed such a prerequisite will be impossible for many and in some peoples’ estimation, a
dishonest affirmation—but I do believe it is at least necessary to recognize that we all, the
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religious and non-religious alike, have mutual points of encounter in which we can meet
and contributions to make to each other’s understanding and search for meaning and
pursuit of the common good. Even if we do not finally adopt or accept each other’s
contributions, we certainly cannot seek justice nor have true peace if we are constantly
working against each other and attempting to destroy the very structures of meaning that
motivate us to seek these things in the first place.
Theoretically, the religious and non-religious could very well go their separate
ways, seek meaning and pursuing justice independently from each other. Many already
do this, avoiding interaction with each other and steering clear of confrontation and
conversations that are uncomfortable. Such an effort, however, only masks potential
conflict for a short time—sooner or later, the dreaded subjects of religion, politics and
ethics that have been avoided in order to “keep the peace” find their way into the
spotlight and those that must deal with the conversation find themselves completely
unprepared to do so. For better or worse, we occupy the same physical and intellectual
space and cannot ultimately live or thrive apart. If we do ignore this fact and are not
intentional about mending the so-called sacred/secular divide, the extreme religious and
non-religious voices of our time will speak for us and make certain that we do become
enemies. We must, therefore, neither avoid each other nor let others represent us in pithy
battles of discontent. The alternative to this “fight or flight” syndrome is genuine
dialogue and we must strive to succeed at it.
In this brief exploration into the so-called sacred/secular divide between the
religious and non-religious, I will attempt to outline the considerations to be made by
both the religious and non-religious seeking mutual understanding for the sake of the

5

common good. Being that I am personally situated in the Christian tradition, there will be
an inevitable emphasis in speaking to the Christian in particular, from a Christian
perspective. That being said, I will also seek as best as I can from my own Christian
identity, to make a case to the diversely religious and non-religious alike. I believe the
contents of what follows are a benefit to all readers.
The principal goal of this thesis is to discover and strengthen a shared space of
dialogue between the religious and non-religious by 1) recognizing the contemporary
efforts that already exist to bring together the religious and non-religious in dialogue even
amidst a popular culture of confrontation, 2) identifying the many ways in which religion
and secularization and the sacred and secular intersect in society and throughout history,
and 3) making propositions for strengthening dialogue between the religious and nonreligious utilizing the practical contributions of theologian Paul Tillich. It is from this
common space of intentional interaction that the religious and non-religious can then
establish positive relationships, learn from each other, and pursue justice together. In the
first chapter, we will begin by looking at the current state of dialogue between the
religious and non-religious in America, the hostility which has plagued the most easilyaccessible spaces for conversation and possible reasons for this antagonism, and the less
visible but no less significant attempts to advocate for positive dialogue opportunities.
We will then take a step back in the second chapter and explore the complex relationship
that has always existed between the religious and non-religious and the sacred and
secular spheres that they inhabit as seen in the sociological and historical development of
secularization and the diverse yet interconnected understandings of the sacred and the
secular in the so-called secularizing process as experienced in the West. Finally, in the
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third chapter, we will consider the work of theologian Paul Tillich, whose contributions
will provide us with practical ways to reinforce the common space of dialogue between
the religious and non-religious. Throughout the exploration, we will continue to maintain
the principal motivation for exploring these different components which is to discover
and strengthen a shared space of dialogue where the religious and non-religious can come
together to build relationships, learn from each other, and pursue justice together.
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CHAPTER 2
THE CURRENT STATE OF DIALOGUE BETWEEN
THE RELIGIOUS AND NON-RELIGIOUS
The Ugly Face of Public Discourse between the Religious and Non-religious
Religion has always been a touchy topic of conversation and can bring out the
best and worst of people. Being that it also incorporates issues of identity, freedom of
choice, meaning-making, personal belief, politics, ethics and so on, conversation
surrounding religion has also proven to be highly volatile. One need not search history
long to identify a plethora of sober examples: violent religious wars, highly-contentious
theological debates, the persecution of religious minorities, etc. While such matters have
historically dealt with fighting within or between religious groups themselves, debates
dealing with religion now include the “non-religious” interlocutor. Non-religious
persons—atheists, agnostics, secular humanists, freethinkers, skeptics, the “unaffiliated,”1
spiritual-but-not-religious persons, and some would even say the institutionallyunaffiliated religious “nones”—want and do have a place in discussions about identity,
meaning and ethics. While not all religious or non-religious persons believe that dialogue
with each other is a necessary or appropriate effort, the fact is that they already are in
conversation about these topics, the topic of “religion” not excluded. Unfortunately, these

“‘Nones’ on the Rise: One-in-Five Adults Have No Religious Affiliation,” The Pew Forum on
Religion & Public Life (Washington D.C.: Pew Research Center, October 9, 2012): 7, accessed January 21,
2014, http://www.pewforum.org/2012/10/09/nones-on-the-rise/.
1
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points of encounter in the public sphere are often more disheartening examples of
interaction than they are encouraging. It seems, from a cursory glance, that the most
obvious and easily-accessible sources of public discourse between the religious and nonreligious demonstrate a conversation that is in a toxic state. One need not look any further
than the online community to see evidence for this space of contention.
On January 14th, 2013 a Texas mom published an essay on CNN iReport titled
“Why I Raise My Children Without God.” In her essay, she explains why it is she
decided to stop “lying” to her kids about heaven and the “inconsistent and illogical
legend of God.”2 She lists and expounds on a number of reasons including the assertions
that “God is a bad parent and role model . . . God is not fair. . . God does not protect the
innocent. . . God is not present. . . God does not teach children to be good,”3 and so on.
More telling than the content of the essay itself was and is the public response to it. In
just two weeks the online post had received three-quarters of a million views and over
nine thousand comments. Something about the content of the essay and its’
corresponding commentary attracted committed attention from both the religious and
non-religious alike, and continues to generate comments to this day. These comments
weave in and out in response to each other, creating a massive string of conversation.
Some commentators play it safe and simply remark on the premise of the article, either
agreeing with Texas mom and applauding her for her courage, or urging her to
disassociate her bad experiences with religion from statements about the character of
God. Cloud52 writes,
“Why I Raise My Kids Without God,” CNN iReport (January 14, 2013), accessed January 10,
2014, http://ireport.cnn.com/docs/DOC-910282.
2

3

Ibid.
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I agree on so many points. This article really touched me deeply, and reflects a lot
of my feelings, frustrations and disappointments about religion. I wish there was a
God, but in my heart I cannot accept that a being who is built up to be so
wonderfully awesome allows so many horrifying things to happen to his
"children.”4
47Donna responds,
I really like this story—and I am a Christian minister who raised her children with
God. She appropriately names the God who doesn't exist but whom the
punishmentalists throw at us all the time. I wish she could know a more gracious
God. That being said, her issues about fairness are so important, even if you are a
progressive Christian like me! 5
Other posts are more candid, expressing a heightened level of emotion and engagement
with the online discussion that has ensued. Springrobin observes,
Those commenting here that god is a "good role model" should READ the bible.
Not pick out pleasant verses, but read the whole thing. I have . . .twice. There is
more violence, bigotry and intolerance in that book than would be allowed on
cable TV! Not to mention the subservient and violent treatment of women. No
thank you. I will happily live my life without this nightmare of a god.6
Ellebee123 comments,
I don't believe in God the way half of the country does, but your argument isn't
well thought out, well rounded or convincing. I totally support your decision not
to raise your children believing in an all-powerful deity, I just think blaming God
for child abuse is as daft as religious zealots blaming atheists for it.7
Soon, all civility goes out the door and the loudest, most frequent voices end up taking
over the conversation, illustrating not dialogue, but demonstrations of anger, ridicule, and
patronization. Shethatisme remarks,
4

Cloud 52, December 23, 2013, comment on “Why I Raise My Kids Without God.”
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47Donna, August 12, 2013, comment on “Why I Raise My Kids Without God.”
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Springrobin, October 31, 2013, comment on “Why I Raise My Kids Without God.”

7

Ellebee123, January 15, 2013, comment on “Why I Raise My Kids Without God.”
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. . . Don't feel bad for the non-believer, atheist, humanist, free-thinker... Your
submission to an imaginary man in the sky, your intellectual bondage, and
ignorant bigotry is something we're happy to live the rest of whatever eternity
is—without . . .8
Crp0499 laments,
wow . . . I feel so sad for this woman and her children… [To] be so lost and so far
afield . . . what a horrible way to live your life. I will pray for this family and
others like her that God might lead them back to the truth and that she might find
happiness and peace again. That poor, poor woman . . . so sad.9
With each click of the button, one discovers an ongoing barrage of increasingly
combative conversation full of disregard, belittlement, and condescension.
Fast forward nearly a year later to the 2013 holiday season as FoxNews.com
launched its “War on Christmas” site10, an extension of its televised commentary on the
same theme. Individuals could both submit stories of how Christmas was “under attack”
in their communities and could also comment on these stories. The stories themselves
attempted to illustrate the various ways in which Christmas was being subverted by, for
example, humanist groups trying to prevent schools from supporting religiously-affiliated
Christmas charities11, public school districts attempting to ban religious music from
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Shethatisme, June 30, 2013, comment on “Why I Raise My Kids Without God.”

9

Crp0499, January 15, 2013, comment on “Why I Raise My Kids Without God.”

10
“War on Christmas,” FoxNews.com, accessed January 9, 2014,
http://nation.foxnews.com/2013/12/25/war-christmas.

Todd Starnes, “Kids, parents fight back after humanist group threatens another school over
Christmas toy drive,” FoxNews.com (November 21, 2013), accessed January 9, 2014,
http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2013/11/21/kids-parents-fight-back-after-humanist-group-threatensanother-school-over/.
11
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holiday concerts,12 and cities that choose to call their festive ferns “holiday” trees instead
of “Christmas” trees.13 While these published anecdotes appeared to all support the
opinion that the Christian holiday was under fire, those partaking in the online discussion
in response to these stories represented an assortment of opinions from both the religious
and non-religious alike. While some comments are more productive than others, a great
majority of the perspectives published represent an antagonistic approach to
conversation. With softer tones of criticism Ado4586 comments,
Another year of fake war on Christmas has come to pass. Hopefully the alarmists
will smarten up for next year and we won't have to feed any unwarranted
persecution complexes stoked by media manipulation. Hope everyone had an
excellent Christmas . . . 14
Steveinalaska also shares a lighter though more satirical critique,
I'm just about to share a Holiday Sleigh Ride with friends. My own personal battle
in the War on Christmas. We'll sing Christmas carols and a little Queen (the kids
like that the best). We'll take a few nips from the hot toddy in the thermos, then
gather together to express our love for other. In other words, just like the
Christians, but without the goofy Sky Fairy stuff.15
With greatly-reduced tact, not unlike other comments made, Agentm0m contends,
Liberals hate that we still celebrate Christmas (CHRIST MASS = Christmas),
because they want us to worship the state and people like Obama, like the Soviets
used to force their people. As long as people continue to have their faith, they
won't believe in the state as their savior and liberals won't be able to force a

Todd Starnes, “Wisconsin School Cracks Down on Religious Christmas Music,” FoxNews.com
(October 8, 2013), accessed January 9, 2014, http://nation.foxnews.com/2013/10/08/starnes-wisconsinschool-cracks-down-religious-christmas-music.
12

13
Joe Harrington, “Holiday Tree or Christmas Tree?,” KOLO-TV (November 26, 2013) on
FoxNews.com, accessed January 9, 2014, http://nation.foxnews.com/2013/11/26/reno-goodbye-christmastree-hello-holiday-tree.
14

Ado 4586, December 26, 2013 comment posted on “War on Christmas.”

15

Steveinalaska, December 23, 2013 comment posted on “War on Christmas.”
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Soviet Style government on us. That is why they hate Christmas and Christ. Have
fun this Christmas by irritating a liberal. Keep the CHRIST in CHRISTmas!16
Finally, Gosarah12345 contributes a seemingly unrelated and yet familiar and prevalent
attitude to the mix: “ every day I let the dog outside and he squats and then deposits on
the lawn something that perfectly represents godless secular progressive thought...”17
Unfortunately, the discussion provoked by the “War on Christmas” site continues in this
same stream, inspiring not genuine dialogue, but an embarrassing indication of our
capacity to default to uncritical, immature name-calling when discussing serious issues.
While commentary on both of the above posts varied, most of the written
responses articulated by the religious and non-religious alike were heated and reactive.
Commentators threw around scripture verses, scientific arguments, stereotypes, “cheap
shots” and more, all of which created a toxic game of “us vs. them” between the religious
and non-religious. This is not to say that all participants in these online forums are
exclusively hardheaded and combative. Indeed, there is at times a modest indication of
patience, listening, and genuine dialogue between diverse perspectives. Overall, however,
there are few who really ask sincere questions, speak solely for themselves, avoid
antagonistic language, or resist the urge to demean those with conflicting perspectives.
What does this grim reality found online tell us about the current state of dialogue
between the religious and non-religious in general? It must be said that online venues like
the examples given are not always representative of the conversation that is actually
happening between the religious and non-religious behind the online scene. They do,

16

Agentm0m, December 23, 2013 comment posted on “War on Christmas.”

17

Gosarah12345, December 24, 2013 comment posted on “War on Christmas.”
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however, point to an attitude that is in fact realized offline as well—an attitude of active
animosity. While there are many religious and non-religious folks who take a different,
dramatically more positive attitude towards dialogue—a fact that we will explore soon—
it is important that we first take seriously the conflict that does exist and attempt to
explain why there is all this ugly tension.
Recognizing the Marginalization of Non-believers
and the Rise of Anti-Religious Sentiment

To adequately explain all the reasons for why there is conflict between the
religious and non-religious would require a whole other exploration all-together—which
we do not have time for here—though it is easy to identify various reasons from a
superficial level: talking about divisive issues obviously risks divisiveness between
interlocutors; it’s a natural human tendency to default to the “fight or flight” response
when faced with conflict; it’s just easier and more enjoyable to ridicule and poke fun at
the other; etc. These are all fairly simplistic explanations, however, and do not adequately
explain the violent, linguistic passion with which the religious and non-religious often
struggle. There is something else, deeply rooted in the relationship between the two
communities itself. There is a hurt and brokenness present in the conflict that appears to
be much less a fight between strangers than it is between estranged friends. There is a
history and context that we don’t always recognize underlining the unstable situation at
hand. While we will explore the history later on, it would be beneficial at this moment to
consider the current American context in which the religious and non-religious find
themselves: both in positions of self-defense fighting for the right to self-expression and
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against absolutism on the “other side.” We will begin by considering the position from
which the non-religious struggle, a position of marginalized, minority status.
To say that the non-religious are a marginalized minority may seem like a
sensational, sweeping statement that can in no way be equated with the reality of others
who are normally identified as such. Certainly the non-religious as a whole do not suffer
the discrimination, economic hardship, and physical harassment that other marginalized
persons in the United States do? Also, is it not the recent proposition that the nonreligious identity is on the rise and growing every year? How then can we speak of them
as a minority? While it is true that the non-religious are growing in number, they are still
a minority in the arena of worldviews. Statistically-speaking, the non-religious are still a
minority group18 who do indeed deal with discrimination and suffer a negative reputation
associated with their non-religious identity—atheists especially. According to a study
published by the University of Minnesota in 2006, atheists are one of the most mistrusted
and disliked minorities in the United States. Using data from various national surveys, the
U of M researchers discovered that “atheists are less likely to be accepted, publicly and
privately, than any others from a long list of ethnic, religious, and other minority
groups.”19 When compared to other minority groups ( i.e., Muslims, gays and lesbians,
recent immigrants, Catholics, Conservative Christians, Jews, African Americans, Asian
Americans, Hispanics, etc.), survey respondents named atheists as the least likely to agree
From “‘Nones’ on the Rise…,” 13. According to a 2012 Pew Report, the religiously unaffiliated
comprise 19.6% of Americans versus 73% who are Christian complimented by an additional 6% who are of
another religious group. Within the “unaffiliated” category, we find that only 2.4% of Americans are atheist
and only 3.3% are agnostic. The other 13.9% claim to be “nothing in particular” and may still hold
religious beliefs.
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with their vision of American society, the group they would least likely let their children
marry,20 and the group they would least likely vote for as president.21
These attitudes towards atheists are not just theoretical, but are materialized in
real-life stories of discrimination which occur most often in contexts characterized by the
presence of a religious majority and efforts to maintain the religious perspective as the
absolute norm. As a minority in the religious arena, many atheists feel that their
convictions and ethical frameworks are regarded with suspicion, or disregarded
completely. Students at Concordia College in Moorhead, MN have been attempting to
form a secular student organization since 2009 when they were told that the group was
“not in compliance with ELCA and the College standards.”22 Three years later, after
making compelling arguments for the recognition of a secular group as part of the
campus’ commitment to interfaith dialogue, the college had yet to give its official
approval.23 It was only in April of 2013 that the Secular Student Community was finally
given official student organization status.24 Sometimes, atheists are harassed or
threatened because of their beliefs. Jessica Ahlquist, a high school atheist from Rhode
Island, received online threats, had to have a police escort to school, and was publicly
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called “an evil little thing” by State Representative Peter Palumbo after she fought to
have a prayer banner removed from her school.25 Quite often, discrimination of atheists
comes in the form of various laws and policies that blocks their full inclusion in society.
In a report published by the International Humanist and Ethical Union (IHEU) in 2012, it
was found that seven states “have in place constitutional provisions that bar atheists from
holding public office.”26 While these laws were deemed unconstitutional in 1961, they
still remain in existence to this day. The report also found that while there are legal
ramifications for discrimination against atheists, cases of such discrimination can go
unchallenged, especially “in situations where it is personally disadvantageous or even
hazardous to take a stand against authority, for example in prisons, the military, and even
some administrative contexts.”27
As can be seen, atheists are a marginalized group in the United States that
experience discrimination and harassment because of their non-religious beliefs. It is no
wonder, therefore, that such a backlash exists from many in the non-religious community
who feel that they must assert themselves against a system that is uncomfortable with
non-belief and weary of non-believers. In an attempt to struggle against religious
absolutism, however, the non-religious have intentionally or unintentionally earned an
absolutist title themselves from their religious competitors who claim that the anti-
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religious rhetoric of many non-religious persons is itself a manifestation of absolutism
and threat to the freedom of expression. While a contentious, anti-religious approach is
not representative of the attitude taken by all non-religious persons, it is the approach for
some of the most vocal, non-religious voices out there. In the same way that the public
image of Christianity has been painted by the ultra-conservative Christian voice, so has
the public image of atheism been painted by its extreme voices. It is the prevalence of
this extreme, absolutist perspective on all sides that is making dialogue very difficult.
Writer and activist Be Scofield has been working to bring the religious and non-religious
together to promote peace and justice but admits that the extreme voices representing the
religious and non-religious are an obstacle: “the mainstream sentiment, fueled by the
most vocal New Atheists and ardent religious fundamentalists is still one of hostility and
animosity . . . slogans like ‘religion is evil,’ and ‘atheists are going to hell’ still frame the
discussion.”28 According to Scofield, hostility between the religious and non-religious
has had severe repercussions and has negatively impacted the idea that the two groups
can be in dialogue. Scofield hopes that there will be room in the new social justice
movement called “Atheism+” for atheists and religious people to work together—for
example, in interfaith contexts—but admits that it will be difficult to engage the more
“hard-lined” atheists who believe that religion is in direct opposition to the pursuit of
social justice:
One of their cherished traditions is dismissing religion at large with crude,
simplistic and antagonistic language. Furthermore, many are staunchly opposed to
any form of interfaith engagement . . . Jen McCreight, the author of the blog post
that led to the creation of the Atheism+ movement, held a sign at the Reason
Be Scofield, “Two Pillars of Religious-Atheist Dialogue,” Huffington Post (June 26, 2012),
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Rally that said, “Obama isn't trying to destroy religion . . . I am.” PZ Myers is
stridently against any sort of “interfaith nonsense” and thinks it could be
profoundly problematic to the atheist movement . . . Adam Lee also echoes his
critical views of religion: “we care about creating a world that's more just, more
peaceful, more enlightened, and we see organized religion as standing in the way
of this goal.”29
Chris Stedman, nationally-known author, humanist, and interfaith proponent also brings
to light the great difficulties that will have to be overcome to bring the religious and nonreligious together. Stedman says that atheists are very divided about the possibility of
participating in interfaith dialogue and that some of this “stems from the fact that many
atheists see themselves as ‘deconversion missionaries’ opposed to any efforts that would
promote religious identities.”30 Stedman goes on to suggest that atheists may also feel
some “resentment over the lack of invitation atheists have sometimes received from
interfaith communities”31 and are reacting accordingly.
Attempts to Advocate for Positive Dialogue
Opportunities and the Role of Interfaith Circles
Despite the above challenges that make dialogue between the religious and nonreligious problematic, individuals from both groups insist that such a task is imperative—
especially if we are serious about protecting freedom of thought and combating injustice.
While the religious/non-religious conversation has proven to be precarious at times, as is
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described above, there are attempts being made to engage in genuine, positive dialogue.
Those advocating for dialogue are turning to interfaith circles who have already had
extensive experience hosting conversations and building relationships across belief
divides. Three Faiths Forum (3FF)—a UK-based interfaith organization that works in the
EU, USA and Middle East32—started off as a partnership between Muslims, Christians,
and Jews33 but now integrates the voices of people from other religious and non-religious
backgrounds. Director of 3FF Stephen Shashoua states that they made the decision to
include the non-religious because
we work towards a society where diversity can be expressed and embraced by all .
. . we work against all forms of stereotyping and champion people’s rights to be
who they are and believe what they do without facing prejudice. These purposes
are in no way the exclusive domain of religious communities.34
Stedman echoes this sentiment and believes that interfaith cooperation is a vital
component to protecting the rights of the religious and non-religious alike. “. . . it is
precisely because I am an atheist, and not in spite of it, that I am motivated to do
interfaith work,” says Stedman, “. . . without religious tolerance and pluralism, I wouldn't
be free to call myself an atheist without fear of retribution.”35 In fact, in the opinion of
Scofield, if the religious were better at advocating for the non-religious’ right to freedom
of thought, the non-religious would be more willing to participate in interfaith dialogue:
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I know it may seem like an oxymoron to ask religious institutions or leaders to
defend atheists who call for the removal of God language from government.
However, so many progressive religious communities are on the front lines of
battling economic injustice, racism, poverty, homophobia, sexism and other forms
of marginalization. There's no reason that we as progressive spiritual or religious
leaders can't address the dehumanization that atheists face—regardless of whether
we agree with their views about God . . . If progressive religious communities
stood up to this type of harassment and began taking the concerns of atheists more
seriously it would be a positive step towards creating dialogue with atheists.36
Such an argument reveals that dialogue between the religious and non-religious is not just
about protecting the freedom to believe what one wants to believe, but is about fighting
injustice.
In their definition of pluralism, the nationally-recognized organization Interfaith
Youth Core maintains that interfaith cooperation is all about “respect for individual
religious or non-religious identity . . . mutually inspiring relationships, and . . . common
action for the common good.”37 Interfaith dialogue, therefore, is not just about talking but
about doing. This assertion speaks to both the religious and non-religious alike whose
belief systems and ethical frameworks motivate them to work towards peace and justice.
Interfaith dialogue, therefore, has the potential to not only reconcile these two groups, but
could create an invaluable base of resources, passion, and skills to struggle against
injustice. Unfortunately, many in the religious and non-religious communities doubt the
need to include the non-religious in interfaith initiatives. Some religious interfaith
proponents ask: how is it inter-faith if those with no faith are involved and does this
compromise the integrity of the movement which was built on the consideration of faith?
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Some non-religious activists ask: why continue to give the time to religion and religious
people and questions when we orient our meaning and motivation for doing good
elsewhere?
Despite the skepticism on both sides, dialogue proponents continue to insist that
bringing the religious and non-religious together benefits everyone, promotes freedom of
belief for all people and is simply the responsible and intelligent thing to do in the fight
for justice. Scofield makes a plea to the Atheist+ community, urging them to partner with
the religious and consider the significant contributions made by theologians and religious
institutions to promote social justice. “Imagine,” he reflects, “the Atheism+ movement
and progressive religious groups united in solidarity against the real enemies: oppression,
injustice and indifference!”38 Stedman, in a similar fashion, points out the positive
influence participation of the non-religious—in this case humanists—could have on
social justice work and interfaith dialogue in general:
The reasons the interfaith movement would be wise to invite Humanist
participation echo the reasons secular individuals might engage in interfaith
endeavors: we exist, they want to end religious extremism and other forms of
oppression and suffering, we have a lot to teach, and we're a religious minority
that experiences discrimination . . . Humanism takes this so-called "spiritual"
component of life—an innate human inclination toward imagination and
moralism—and articulates it in a distinct way that is well-equipped to add
richness and complexity to the interfaith movement.39
By incorporating the non-religious in interfaith dialogue, argues Stedman, the movement
can only become stronger and better. “Any discomfort religious people experience over
engaging with the nonreligious must be set aside for the sake of truly inclusive interfaith
38
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collaboration,” writes Stedman, “. . . They are part of a growing population of people
who don't believe in God but still want the same things everyone else wants: meaning,
community, and a better world.”40 The non-religious may be a minority, but their voices
are vital and their goals extremely relevant to the interfaith movement.
As can be seen, the American context and recent history behind the relationship
between the religious and non-religious is fraught with complexity. The marginalization
of atheists and other non-religious persons has created a backlash of mistrust of and anger
against religious individuals and institutions. Struggling against religious absolutism,
many in the non-religious community have themselves become intolerant of religion and
religious persons, making absolutist claims of their own about the evil of religion. This
has resulted in both a vicious cycle of religious/non-religious extremism and great
hesitancy from both the religious and non-religious community asked to consider
participating in dialogue, interfaith dialogue included. Nevertheless, religious and nonreligious leaders alike are adamant that dialogue and interfaith cooperation is necessary if
both communities are serious about protecting freedom of thought (which includes
religion) and fighting for the common good.
For many, the desire to establish right relationships, promote freedom of thought,
and seek justice will be reason enough to engage in dialogue together. For others, the
tension that exists between the religious and non-religious may still be too overwhelming
of an obstacle to overcome. Entering into dialogue with a worldview that is so incredibly
different, even contrary, to one’s own can be intimidating and may not seem worth the
energy and effort. I would like to suggest that part of this intimidation comes not from a
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lack of motivation, but a lack of knowledge about the history and terminology that
already surrounds the conversation which may discourage people from trying. The best
way to educate one’s self in these matters is to, of course, just enter into dialogue and
learn from dialogue partners. For those who prefer to enter into a conversation with more
preparation, however, we will now attempt to familiarize the reader, in particular the
Christian reader, with a basic knowledge of the incredible conversation between the
religious and non-religious that has already existed for centuries.
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CHAPTER 3
UNDERSTANDING THE COMPLEX RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
THE SACRED AND THE SECULAR
Dialogue between the religious and non-religious is not new, nor is the
relationship between the spheres in which they claim to inhabit new either, these spheres
being the sacred and the secular. From the surface, one may automatically equate the
sacred with the religious and the secular with the non-religious. Do not religious people
believe themselves to be in touch with a sacred sphere in which God or gods reign and
give meaning to life, angelic beings relay divine messages, the unexplainable and
miracles happen, salvation is found and all forms of transcendence flourish? Do not nonreligious people deny the existence of this sacred sphere, claiming loyalty to the secular
sphere where humans are ultimately responsible for themselves, science explains all
phenomena, technological advances sustain life, and only that which can be rationally
and empirically experienced is worth considering. Already, however, we find these
assumptions lacking because meaning-making, “salvation” and transcendence are not
regulated to the religious alone, nor is science, rationality, and human responsibility the
expertise of the non-religious alone. Apparently, the religious and non-religious can
inhabit both spheres and whether or not persons who would identify as either would like
to make such a claim, it will now be made clear here that they do in fact share a common
space in which the sacred and secular meet.
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The ambiguous line between the sacred and the secular is not a new discovery.
Not only are religious persons often accused of being “too secular,” it is also the case that
many non-religious persons are said to have a “religion” of their own, masking sacred
concerns in non-religious language. Both of these claims can be equally substantiated or
denied depending on one’s definitions of religion and non-religion, the sacred and the
secular. Adding to the chaotic mix of definitions that confuse the conversation are the
diverse understandings of secularization, a concept that is often spoken of but whose
meaning and significance is also hotly disputed. While reconciling these two spheres may
seem like an unlikely, difficult and overly complicated endeavor, I believe that
recognizing the places in which they do overlap will be invaluable to our pursuit here,
which is to recognize and strengthen the common space of dialogue between the religious
and non-religious where we can build right relationships, learn from each other, and
pursue the common good together. The ambiguity and complexity which surrounds the
sacred/secular question need not be threatening but can in fact give room to the
possibility of shared space where the religious and non-religious can ask difficult
questions, articulate meaning, and seek justice together. We will begin by looking at
secularization, a term that plays an integral role in the discussion within and between the
religious and non-religious communities. A process and word so often eschewed by the
religious, secularization actually has its roots in religion itself.
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The Sociological and Historical Development of Secularization
Secularization, what many consider to be the process in which there is a practical
and symbolic move from the sacred to the secular sphere,1 is an overly misunderstood
concept often credited as the “enemy” of religion. Unbeknownst to many, however,
secularization is not only intimately tied up with religion, but is considered by many
scholars to be the very product of religion. Such is the opinion of both well-known
sociologist Peter Berger and philosopher Charles Taylor, both of whom offer an
incredible amount of insight into the historical development of what we now call
secularization. The term “secularization” itself has had many meanings and has produced
an array of emotional responses throughout history. The first use of the term referred to
the process of repossessing land and property from the church. There was already,
therefore, a move from the sacred to the secular sphere, economic authority being
transitioned one to the other. Later, the term took on more emotionally-charged
connotations, used positively by anti-religious persons to describe “the liberation of
modern man from religious tutelage” and negatively by religious persons as the process
of “de-Christianization” or “paganinzation.”2 Very early then, consideration of the term
and its significance brew divisiveness between the religious and non-religious. Not all
religious persons would take this view, however, and secularization would be seen by
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some theologians, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, for example, as a fulfillment of Christianity itself,
and therefore ultimately irrelevant, a term that “should be abandoned as confusing if not
downright meaningless.”3 Whether considered valuable or not, however, the term
“secularization” has not disappeared nor does it show signs of doing so.
Despite there being debate over the legitimacy of the term itself, Berger and
Taylor both make worthy attempts to formulate definitions of the concept. Berger defines
secularization as “the process by which sectors of society and culture are removed from
the domination of religious institutions and symbols.”4 The move from private to public
education could be considered one example. Taylor, while agreeing with this definition,
does not limit it so. He expands this definition to include not only the separation of
religion from the public sphere,5 but also the decline of religious belief and practice in
individuals’ lives6 and more importantly, the changing “conditions of belief” in which
individuals now have meaningful options for systems of belief and unbelief.7 One may
not only choose a public education for her child, but she may also decide to be married in
a courthouse instead of a church and go to a swami or trusted friend instead of a pastor
for spiritual advice. While these above understandings of secularization are relatively
recent, having emerged over the last century, it will be discovered that the process being
described was in play long before the term materialized.
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Berger locates some of the earliest uses of the secularization process within
religion itself, ancient Judaism in particular. He makes a strong case for this argument by
referring to the “demythologizing” move of the ancient Hebrews from the mythical world
of Egypt and Mesopotamia,8 the increased importance of the individual and significance
of individual actions in the Old Testament,9 and the ethical rationalization developed by
the ancient prophets.10 The Genesis story is an excellent example. While the Hebrews did
borrow various elements from the creation myths born out of their Mesopotamian
context, they also stripped these stories of much of their mythology. They did this by
reducing the gods of the cosmos to a God outside and separate from the cosmos,
reutilizing the well-known myth of the goddess Tiamat as simply “an abstract
metaphysical category,” and asserting that human beings were distinct and separate from
the rest of the natural and living world. It is through this Genesis account, Berger
explains, that one finds a “fundamental Biblical polarization between the transcendent
God and man, with a thoroughly ‘demythologized’ universe between them.”11 In other
words, the Hebrews “secularized” the religious stories of their time by removing them
from mythical categories and placing them in a worldly, historical one where God acted
in time and space as experienced by the Hebrews. “It may be said,” Berger expounds,
“that the transcendentalization of God and the concomitant ‘disenchantment of the world’
opened up a ‘space’ for history as the arena of both divine and human actions.”12 The
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power and relevance of the ancient gods was challenged, undoubtedly considered “unreligious” or even “anti-religious” by those who still oriented themselves in the popular
Mesopotamian religion of the time.
Moving forward several centuries, Berger observes the secularizing process again,
but this time in the Christian tradition with the rise of Protestantism in which the presence
of the sacred in real life ( i.e., “mystery, miracle, and magic”) is minimized.13 With the
major reformulation of theological thought that was born out of the Reformation, the
belief that the secular sphere could be connected with the sacred sphere was challenged.
This was a major “secularization” of Catholic thought which maintained that human
beings could be in touch with the sacred in a number of ways including “the sacraments
of the church, the intercession of the saints, [and] the recurring eruption of the
‘supernatural’ in miracles.”14 With Protestantism, these forms of mediation were
dramatically reduced, and sometimes disappeared altogether.
. . . Protestantism may be described in terms of an immense shrinkage in the scope
of the sacred in reality, as compared with its Catholic adversary. The sacramental
apparatus is reduced to a minimum and, even there, divested of its more numinous
qualities. The miracle of the mass disappears altogether. Less routine miracles, if
not denied altogether, lose all real significance . . . The immense network of
intercession that unites the Catholic in this world with the saints . . . disappears as
well.15
The only real miracle left by Protestant thought, writes Berger, is “God’s sovereign
grace” as mediated through God’s word.16 With time, he maintains, this last-remaining

13

Ibid., 111-113.

14

Ibid., 112.

15

Ibid., 111.

16

Ibid., 112.

30

connection with the sacred would also be brought into question and “open the floodgates
of secularization” so that for many, no empirically-verifiable relationship with the sacred
would remain. “A sky empty of angels,” he says, “becomes open to the intervention of
the astronomer and, eventually, of the astronaut.”17 In the same way that ancient Judaism
stripped the old Mesopotamian mythologies of their legitimacy for the Hebrews,
therefore, we find that the Reformation also stripped much of the Catholic tradition of its
legitimacy for Protestants.
Taylor develops this history of secularization even further, describing in detail
three distinct religious forms demonstrated through time that ultimately brought about
secularization—these being the “ancient régime,” the “Age of Mobilization,” and the
“Age of Authenticity.” In the “ancient régime” matrix (a time which includes the ancient
Judaism and Protestant Reformation described above), religion and its hierarchical nature
was intimately involved with the functioning of society. This is what Taylor calls a
“Durkheimian” society in which the religious and social are one, the kingdom or state a
fulfillment of divine will.18 Taylor describes this worldview in more detail:
. . . the understanding of order widespread among the people . . . is of a premodern kind, an order of hierarchical complementarity, which is grounded in the
Divine Will, or the Law which holds since time out of mind, or the nature of
things . . . we are subordinated to King, Lord, Bishops, nobility, each in their
rank; and also for the microcosm of the village or the parish, where priest and
noble . . . hold sway, and each person has their place. Indeed, we only belong to
the larger society through our membership in this local microcosm.19
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Religion, therefore, while having been stripped time and time again of its mythical
elements, was still of central importance to the majority of society during the “ancient
régime.” Much of this loyalty to religion, however, was not deliberate but automatic.
While everyone was “religious” in a sense, critical questions of theology were not
necessarily on the minds of everyday people who were much more interested in simply
fulfilling their roles in the community. These roles were adequately accomplished
through religious rituals20—there was therefore, no need to search for alternatives or
question the already-available frameworks. This is not to say that religion wasn’t
important—indeed it was—or that people in general did not have deep religious
convictions—indeed, they did—but religion played a practical role and was not an area
that attracted much deliberation apart from scholars and those with the time to think
about such things. Unquestioned loyalty to religious categories and authority, however,
would not always be maintained by all people.
As the West entered into the nineteenth century, religion and the church would
face a number of difficulties as the “ancient régime” came to an end and a new age came
into being. While it was taken for granted that the church played a role of upmost
importance in a society shaped by divine will, this divine role was soon reconsidered by
some who began to question the allegiance of the church and its religious leaders, both of
whom seemed to be increasingly aligned with the wealthy and their interests.21 This
resulted in a resistance to church authority, seen within religious movements themselves,
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the Reformation being one example.22 These rebellions, however, did not always happen
from a religious frame of reference. “Secularist” intellectuals and social elites also
rebelled against church authority, the French Revolution being an example of this type.23
Questions of wealth and economics continued to be an issue as more and more people
moved to the cities. “. . . the new city-dweller, no longer relating back to a living
community,” writes Taylor, “. . . would find himself with a void in his spiritual life, and
have to find way of weaving forms and community allegiances in the new situation.”24
Lay ideologies filled this “void,” gaining in popularity as an increasing number of
alternative thought systems came into being. “Modalities of exclusive humanism were
now options,”25 writes Taylor, which were often philosophically instead of religiously
based. Here, we begin to see Taylor’s third definition of secularization emerge ( i.e., “the
changing ‘conditions of belief’ in which individuals now have meaningful options for
systems of belief and unbelief”).26 This did not only include exclusive humanism ( i.e.,
the structure of meaning that allows for the flourishing of people without reverence for a
higher being or power),27 however, but new forms of religious practice as well. Despite
negative attitudes towards religious leaders, therefore, the Church also managed to
successfully reform itself to the extent needed to provide people with fresh religious
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alternatives as opposed to the old, stifling models. It rid of “rigorism, the harsh stance
towards sinners,” and developed a “more compassionate stance” and “was more tolerant
and open to popular modes of piety . . .”—all of which retained and grew participation in
religious practice.28
Notwithstanding the growth of new religious options, the end of the “ancient
régime” did arrive and transitioned into the beginning of the “Age of Mobilization,” a
movement that Taylor places in the mid-nineteenth to mid-twentieth centuries.29 During
this time, the will of God was no longer assumed to be the sole responsibility of the
rulers—who were supposed to have the unquestioned support and obedience of the
people—but was instead the work of the people themselves. This “neo-Durkheimian”
approach, called “the Modern Moral Order,” relied not on a hierarchical structure, but the
collectivities of “disembedded individuals” who were called to create societies
“structured for mutual benefit, in which each respects the rights of others, and offers them
mutual help of certain kinds.”30 These groupings of individuals would inevitably lead to
the establishment of various religious denominations, each of which was “a divinely
established body” that was created for the purpose of fulfilling “the plan of God.”31 This
was especially the case in the United States, where denominations could flourish and
were not discouraged by “state religion” as was the case in much of Europe, although
there were exceptions.32 One began to see a heightened separation of church and state
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since a single denomination could not represent the whole state—“Denominationalism
implies that churches are all equally options” Taylor explains.33 That being said, there
was in early American history still an overall “Christian” identity that affected politics.34
Religious affiliation became connected with political affiliation, and religion became the
way “civilized” society was believed to be achieved.35 This reality, while still associated
with religious denominations, created opportunities for secular circles as well, “enabling
certain populations to become capable of functioning as productive, ordered agents in a
new non-traditional environment.”36 These agents, while more free than ever to succeed
apart from one singular, traditional religious institution, still chose to be affiliated and
identified with particular groupings.37 This freedom to “self-identify” one’s self would be
the catalyst for the next major shift from the “Age of Mobilization” to the “Age of
Authenticity,” forever affecting the religious and non-religious alike.
It is in the “Age of Authenticity”—where Taylor places our world now—that
religion undergoes major changes and secularization even more attention. In this
movement, begun in the 1960s,38 “self-orientation” amidst chaos becomes “a mass
phenomenon.”39 It becomes increasingly more important to people that they have a
choice in what they believe or not believe—in other words, an “authentic” approach to
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their individual lives. Taylor describes this approach of “authenticity” as a way of life
that affirms that
each one of us has his/her own way of realizing our humanity, and that it is
important to find and live out one’s own, as against surrendering to conformity
with a model imposed on us from outside, by society, or the previous generation,
or religious or political authority.40
By embracing this approach, there is an inevitable move by some segments of society to
reject religious forms of the past, more so than was seen by groups of social elites during
previous times. This is the reality of a “post-Durkheimian” age in which choice is key
and one adheres to that religious or spiritual practice that “moves and inspires” them—
not to those beliefs or rituals forced by some other authority. To do so would be
“wrong… absurd, contradictory.”41 Taylor maintains that this new development ( i.e.,
having a “choice that feels right for me”) not only results in some peoples’ choice to
move away from religion—for whom that “feels right” for them— but also results in
peoples’ move towards existing structures of religion and even newly-articulated
understandings of religion—because that is what “feels right” for them.42 This is a
familiar attitude in many religious settings where people are encouraged to “claim their
faith,” confirm their beliefs and take ownership of their religious convictions.
Secularization, as can be seen above, has a much more complicated history than is
normally considered when discussing the concept. It is a process not only embraced by
many non-religious persons who may want to see more or all forms of public life
separated from religious symbols and institutions, but also by many religious persons
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who have for theological and practical reasons advocated that mythical elements be
detached from religious doctrine, that political power be transferred from religious to
secular institutions, and that loyalty to religious categories be the result of authentic
choice and not forced coercion (or even uncritical acceptance for that matter). To speak
of secularization as the “enemy of religion” on one side or to claim it as a tool for ridding
society of religion on the other side, is to deny the historical importance it has had for
religion, as proliferated by religious people themselves. Admittedly, this is a history that
can be easily forgotten or even rejected by various individuals and groups in America
who wish to unite politics with their own brand of religion at the cost of squelching other
religious and non-religious worldviews or on the other end, confusing the separation of
church and state with the total privatization of religious expression as if someone’s public
choices were not informed by their religious convictions. These approaches do not
obviously contribute positively to the environment needed to have productive dialogue
and collaboration between religious and non-religious entities. Instead, when considering
the history behind secularization, it may be seen that the motivations for maintaining a
distinction between religious authority and “secular matters” can and are shared by the
religious and non-religious alike, even if there are exceptions. This distinction, however,
does not require silence on the issue nor should it limit opportunities for religious and
non-religious expressions. There is a shared space that exists in which the religious and
non-religious can come together to publicly dialogue about these issues. This shared
space, we shall soon see, is not just built upon a common history of the development of
secularization, but is also made possible by more closely considering the elements that
are so intimately connected with the secularization question: the sacred and the secular.
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Secularization and the Ambiguous Space between the Sacred and the Secular
As a deer longs for flowing streams, so my soul longs for you, O God. My soul
thirsts for God, for the living God. When shall I come and behold the face of
God? My tears have been my food day and night, while people say to me
continually, “Where is your God?” (Ps. 42:1-3, NRSV)
The cry of the psalmist—the longing for God, meaning, peace—is not an unfamiliar cry.
It is the cry of the human in history, past and present. This cry for meaning and fullness
in life echoes through time and is present not only in the loud clamoring of the major
spiritual and religious movements of history, but also in the quiet solitude of the human
heart for every person who has ever lived—the religious and non-religious alike. Many in
our world today may question this assertion, doubting sincerely that every individual is
seeking a “meaningful life.” This is especially the accusation of many religious persons
who charge those who are labeled or self-identify as non-religious of living out lives of
“meaninglessness,” or worse, abject selfishness. These accusations, however, are weakly
supported and do not stand up to evidence for the contrary. It is found throughout history,
past and present, that non-religious persons are very much capable of articulating
meaning in their lives—articulations that are quite often the source of energy that
motivate them to pursue the common good—even if these frameworks are not understood
or accepted by religious persons. Admittedly, this can be disconcerting for many religious
people who struggle to reconcile the fact that those they call “unbelievers” or “secular”
are not all bad people and that somehow they can be good without God. Somehow,
bewildering for many of those who orient their entire way of being within a religious
framework, the non-religious have found or created ways to be in the world that bring
them peace and comfort without the need for Another, and apparently without the need
for the sacred. It is this supposed movement of loyalty from the sacred to the secular—
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secularization as it is often characterized—that has become a problem for those who view
a relationship and connection with the sacred as vital to meaning-making and the
inspiration for doing good. Is this movement from the sacred to the secular, however, as
simple as it seems? Have we completely cut ourselves off from the sacred? Do the nonreligious really have no grasp of or respect for that which constitutes the sacred? Is that
which is secular as unholy and un-sacred as many religious people have described it as
being? Are the sacred and secular totally incompatible? Answers to these questions vary
greatly and depend on how one defines and understands the sacred, the secular and the
process of secularization that encompasses both of these concepts. What’s more, the task
of responding to these questions is deeply affected by the identities and values held by
those who study and wrestle with it. The scholarly and public exploration of
secularization, and the so called sacred/secular divide, is not just an academic or
educational duty for those who are involved, but a question of values, the future, and for
some . . . the integrity of faith and non-faith itself. It is no wonder that conversation about
these issues can be so emotional for those involved. If the goal of this investigation is to
seek unity, however, what resources can be explored to mend this so-called
sacred/secular divide that has developed? For those religious and non-religious persons
who seek to reconcile their diverse perspectives, who desire to be in dialogue with each
other, to build right relationships and seek justice together, the work of philosopher and
historian of religion Mircea Eliade, the previously considered sociologist Peter Berger,
and professor of religion Conrad Ostwalt can all be helpful resources.
It should be said before we begin analyzing the contributions of these scholars
that some of the perspectives held by them are not equally “friendly” in their stance

39

towards secularization and that which is associated with the secular. Eliade and Berger
especially share a bias in favor of the promotion of religious orientation and are more
skeptical about the merits of secularization and non-religious worldviews. Ostwalt, on the
other hand, is not so skeptical and is openly optimistic about the value of secularization
and the secular, all the while supportive of religious worldviews as well. Why then
engage them here? Taken together, I believe the ideas of Eliade, Berger and Ostwalt can
collectively begin to help us positively recognize the shared space that exists between the
sacred and the secular, the religious and non-religious. Their thoughts are especially
helpful for the religious person as the scholars themselves write from a religious
perspective. This does not, however, mean they cannot be useful to the non-religious
person as well.
Despite having distinct and differing approaches to secularization— and the
sacred and the secular elements that are a part of this phenomenon—all three academics
affirm one thing: even though the role of religious institutions is undoubtedly changing,
the “religious” spirit of the human species is still alive and well and as present as ever.
They maintain that this “religious” spirit, which seeks meaning and the good, is inherent
in all people. While many may disagree with the use of the word “religious” to describe
this attribute, a compelling case is made that all people, religious and non-religious alike,
share an appreciation for that which is “sacred,” even if they do not name it as such. In
Eliade’s estimation, this makes secularization an illusion since the sacred is actually
inescapable, being simply hidden within the secular. Berger says that this makes
secularization a misnomer since the “desecularization” of the world is the real norm.
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Finally, for Ostwalt, secularization is actually a natural, never-ending exchange between
the sacred and secular in which the sacred is secularized and the secular is sacralized.
In Bryan S. Rennie’s Reconstructing Eliade: Making Sense of Religion, Eliade’s
thoughts on religion and the “religious” nature of people are thoroughly explored,
beginning with his treatment of “hierophany,” or what he describes as “lived experience
as simultaneously revealing and concealing the sacred.”43 This concept, if seriously
considered, can provide religious persons a way of understanding how all people, the
non-religious included, can and do identify the “sacred” and appropriate it into their lives
to construct meaning, even apart from belief in God, the afterlife, etc.44 That is because
meaning, according to Eliade, is constructed by experiencing that which is “real” and
“concrete”45 and is focused “on humanity, not on the debated independent existence of a
Divine Being.”46 That is not to say, however, that one could not believe in a higher being.
Belief in God for the Christian, for example, is itself a hierophany and is therefore “real”
for those experiencing it as such. While many rightfully critique this process for leading
to relativism, Rennie argues that Eliade would actually contend that universally we are all
human and would therefore “all have a similar preparation and inhabit a similar reality,”
making pure relativism not ultimately possible.47 More importantly, and the point being

43
Bryan S. Rennie, Reconstructing Eliade: Making Sense of Religion (Albany, NY: State
University of New York Press, 1996), 11.
44

Ibid., 20.

45

Ibid., 8.

46

Ibid., 21.

47

Ibid., 128.

41

made here, is that under this system Eliade would actually claim that all persons are
essentially “religious.”
Being that all persons perceive the “real” (though sometimes confusing it with the
“profane” or that which is “illusory” and “unreal”)48 all persons can actually be
considered “religious.” To describe this, Eliade uses the term homo religiosus, or
“religious humanity”49 describing the human as one who “always believes that there is an
absolute reality, the sacred, which transcends this world but manifests in this world,
thereby sanctifying it . . .”50 Though it is possible people will not always perceive the
real—which is concealed by the profane—it cannot all together be avoided. Rennie
explains,
. . . those who recognize the structures which identify the real in their own lives
have the most authentic existence since they exist in the awareness of the facts,
that is, more completely in the real, the sacred. It is the mistaken apprehension of
an distinction between religious and “non-religious” humanity which implies a
normative judgment. Eliade is not insisting that humanity should be religious. He
is pointing out that, in truth, we are religious. To live one’s life as fully as
possible “in the sacred” is then to be aware of the sources of one’s own
apprehensions of the real, of one’s own hierophanies, one’s own religion.51
All people, therefore, have their own “religion” and way of perceiving the “real” or
“sacred” as experienced in their individual lives. They may not all call it “religion” since
traditional definitions of religion may not entice them to do so. If everyone is religious in
Eliade’s estimation, however, how do we explain the phenomenon of secularization?
According to Rennie’s take on Eliade,
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The innate human desire which he [humankind] detects to live in proximity and
constant contact with the real produces symbolisms which extend the
hierophanies throughout otherwise profane human existence… this has eventually
led to a complete identification of the profane with the sacred and a concomitant
difficulty in recognizing the real . . . This, I hope, has gradually become clear as
the primary characteristic of modern secular humanity.52
Secularization then, is an illusion—or the heightened “hiddenness of the sacred” which is
to a large part due to the modern person’s commitment to rationalism. Even rational
people, however, “find themselves emotionally committed to a conceptual schema which
does not clearly and entirely correspond to the dictates of rationalism”53 and are thus
again functioning as “religious” persons.
In a humble “correction” of sorts from his earlier book The Sacred Canopy:
Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion which was covered in the first part of
chapter two, Peter Berger contends with enthusiasm in his more recent commentary
found in the volume that he edited, The Desecularization of the World, that society in a
global context is not undergoing a phenomenon of secularization but is in fact
experiencing the opposite—“desecularization.” Just as Eliade had argued before, the
religious nature of human beings cannot be denied nor can it be stopped from expressing
itself.
The religious impulse, the quest for meaning that transcends the restricted space
of empirical existence in this world, has been a perennial feature of humanity . . .
It would require something close to a mutation of the species to extinguish this
impulse for good.54
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Given this “religious impulse,” it should not surprise anyone, says Berger, that religion is
just as present and as strong as ever. Secularization, therefore, is a misnomer because
people are not moving away for the sacred, but moving towards it as they always have
and always will. Unlike past contexts in which religious bodies often dominated the area
in which they flourished, however, Berger admits that today’s globalized context has
indeed brought about a new situation in which persons holding diverse religious beliefs
must now deal with each other in a way they did not previously. This is supported by
other authors in Berger’s edited volume, all of whom reflect on how their various
religious communities have been coping with this increasingly pluralistic context which
includes commitments to secular ideologies. According to George Weigel, under the
leadership of Pope John Paul II the Roman Catholic Church approached this
interreligious context by emphasizing universal human rights and the dignity (and
agency) of all people no matter what their background ( i.e., religious or not).55 The
Jewish people, in a very different manner, says Jonathan Sacks, are working on
reclaiming their religious identity after years of outmarriage and secularization within the
Jewish community throughout the world in the nineteenth century until present day.56
Grace Davie points out that in Europe, a now mostly secularized continent, secular
governments are dealing with major questions about the increased populations of
religious immigrants.57 Abdullahi A. An-Na’im writes that Muslims around the world are
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also trying to figure out how to govern their countries in such a way that stays true to
their commitment to religiously-influenced law while also being simultaneously
committed to human rights and conscious of international realities without falling victim
to both religious and secular fundamentalist approaches that deny one commitment for
another.58
So it would seem, considering the above situations, that religion is not so much
“threatened” by secularization as it is by establishing its identity within increasingly
religiously-diverse communities and global political and economic systems. This is an
important consideration to make in our pursuit for dialogue between the religious and
non-religious because it not only indicates the urgent need for reconciling differences
between diverse belief systems, but also highlights the fact that “religion” as an issue and
topic of conversation shows no sign of disappearing. We need, more than ever, ways of
dialoguing about religion and belief that build up and do not tear down relationships and
efforts to do good. While Berger does not give a lot of credit to secular and non-religious
worldviews, this dialogue includes all persons, the religious and non-religious alike, who
seek the freedom to express and live out their “impulse for good.” Berger makes the
claim that this impulse will be impossible to extinguish, and he is right. What he does not
do a very good job at recognizing, however, is that this impulse is also shared by nonreligious persons and those who consider themselves to be “secular.” As we will now see
in the work of Conrad Ostwalt, the desire to connect with the sacred will indeed always
persist, sometimes within religious contexts, but also within secular contexts as well.
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Unlike Berger who argues for a “desecularization” thesis, in Secular Steeples:
Popular Culture and the Religious Imagination Ostwalt contends that secularization is
indeed the norm but functions in such a way that takes into account the same affirmation
that Berger and Eliade hold: religious consciousness is powerful in peoples’ lives and is
not going away, probably ever.59 The form in which this religious impulse will express
itself, however, will inevitably change. It is changing today, asserts Ostwalt, by taking on
more secular forms. This goes two ways he says: 1) when traditional sacred forms are
secularized to become more like secular forms and 2) when secular forms are sacralized
and give expression to sacred concepts.60 In both instances, he maintains, secularization is
what occurs. As where Berger looks at the numbers and argues that the world is
undergoing a “desecularization” process because just as many people as ever are openly
religious, Ostwalt looks at the cultural manifestations of religion themselves and
concludes that while religious expression is indeed as strong as ever, it is actually
happening thanks to the adoption of secular cultural forms such as non-church-like
buildings and spaces61, literature62, film63 and much more. This is not something that
should frighten religious people, he contends. Unlike some of his colleagues, Ostwalt
does not see secular culture as the antithesis of religion.
. . . rather than seeing sacred and secular as oppositional whereby one must
capitulate to the other, it is more helpful to see sacred and secular worldviews on
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a continuum along which we attempt to define ‘the good, the true, and the
beautiful’ in commonly held value structures including religion, popular culture,
literature, music, and community. Be it categorized as secular or conceived as
sacred, the compartmentalization of culture matters less than legitimation of value
for a group, either formally or informally, conceived within a common cultural
context.64
Such a concept is extremely helpful in a cross-cultural, multi-religious context and could
serve as a good starting point for dialogue between religious and non-religious folks who
may be able to identify the common cultural forms they share and even work
collaboratively to express meaning together through these forms.
One of Ostwalt’s arguments that may be challenging, especially for religious
institutions, is that it may also be the case— and in fact many times is—that if a person
cannot understand and/or express their religious instinct within a religious institution (or
even if they can) they may choose to deliberately move into the secular sphere to do so.
“It might be that in our postmodern context, with shifting authority structures,” Ostwalt
contends, “popular cultural expression of religiosity is more important, more available,
and more powerful than traditional expressions of religious truth.65 This could explain the
rising number of religious “nones” who have severed ties with religious institutions and
found meaning in more secular forms or the “spiritual-but-not-religious” folk who are not
affiliated with a religious community buy may still be actively involved in practices of
meditation, prayer, and so on. This could also, however, explain the increased diversity of
religious movements themselves which have moved away from traditional religious
structures and towards more popular, secular forms of expression.
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The possibility exists that religion dissipated throughout the culture, arising
authentically in the hands and creations of representatives who are removed from
the restrictions of orthodoxy, can become a religion that empowers and functions
to grant meaning to a more diverse population than can official religious bodies
alone.66
While this need not be a bad thing, it can admittedly be discouraging for religious
institutions that hope to retain their membership and may seem like a continued
proliferation of the “pains” of secularization.
We learn from Ostwalt, therefore, that the search for meaning, the “recognition of
the real,” the “religious impulse,” the “expression of religiosity,” or whatever it is
scholars may call it, can be pursued in the religious and secular spheres. The sacred and
the secular are not as distant as we make them to be and the sacred/secular divide, or
“problem” of secularization as we so often call it, is not as simply defined or understood
as we thought it either. This is an important realization for the religious and non-religious
both. The secular sphere is not void of ways to express meaning and inspire good. The
religious, or “sacred,” sphere is not a closed-system incapable of changing and giving
birth to new forms of expression in light of secular realities. The sacred is found in the
secular and the secular cannot escape the sacred—the separation between them is found
to be fairly ambiguous. While one may or may not agree with these assertions, Ostwalt
provides the religious and non-religious seeking dialogue together, a shared space in
which they may not have everything in common, but are both sincerely attempting to
make meaning and do what is right based on the frameworks of belief from which they
orient themselves.
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Eliade, Berger and Ostwalt all help create the possibility of shared space between
the religious and non-religious, though a warning should be mentioned. While
considering the possibility that all people share a universal “religious” nature can be
helpful for identifying common ground between people of diverse belief systems, it is
also true that utilizing the label “religious” for all people can be considered imperialistic
and unhelpful for others. The homo religious concept will definitely be regarded as a
useful category by some religious and non-religious persons who are trying to relate at a
deeper level of understanding. In this case, those coming together in dialogue may choose
to adopt this universal understanding as a common denominator that unites the group
while still allowing for diverse manifestations and expressions. That being said, it may
also be decided that the word “religious” is too much associated with particular religious
beliefs and a different word may be used such as “spiritual” or “the common human
search for meaning and good,” or so on. It may also be the case, however, that the homo
religiosus category will be difficult if not impossible for others to accept. Not all
religious people will want “their” category to be too broadly applied to others who do not
share their own commitment to religion as it is traditionally understood. Neither will all
non-religious people consent to being adopted under this language of no choice of their
own and even contrary to their own self-identity. In this instance, it may be better to
discard the concept all together and explore other points of commonality or ways of being
peacefully in disagreement with each other. However one may decide to proceed, the
point is that the religious and non-religious, while having incredibly different worldviews
which must be respected and appreciated distinctly from each other, the undeniable fact is
that we all do share in a common humanity together, a humanity which does seek and

49

make meaning on a daily basis, and sometimes better than other times, desires peace,
justice, and good. Respecting and recognizing this common humanity opens up a shared
space in which the religious and non-religious can dialogue, build right relationships, and
seek the common good together.
All this being said, while the language we use may not always play a prominent
role in whether or not we can dialogue together—sometimes agreeing to certain terms
and categories can be incredibly useful and fruitful for building the deep relationships
needed to overcome division and motivate action for the common good. That is why, in
the following chapter, we will make very specific recommendations for the religious and
non-religious coming together to dialogue as inspired by the work of theologian Paul
Tillich. These recommendations are like any, propositions, and can be embraced or
denied. Given the opportunity to be tested, however, I believe they could strengthen the
common space of dialogue we have already discovered exists between the religious and
non-religious.
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CHAPTER 4
TILLICHIAN CONTRIBUTIONS FOR STRENGHTENING DIALOGUE
BETWEEN THE RELIGIOUS AND NON-RELIGIOUS
Much of our approach to the question of dialogue between the religious and nonreligious has so far relied on anecdotes from popular culture, considerations of emerging
trends, and historical and sociological perspectives on the concepts and movements that
encompass the conversation about the so called sacred/secular divide. By engaging these
fields of study, we have discovered that a common space of dialogue does indeed already
exist between the religious and non-religious. What has been missing until this point,
however, is the engagement of a substantial theological perspective. Why, when a solid
case has already been made for the benefits and points of entry into dialogue between the
religious and non-religious, ought we engage the study of God? Have we not already
pushed too far in the previous chapter by suggesting that all people have a religious
nature? Is this not condescending for those entering into the dialogue with an intentional
and deliberate choice to self-identify as other than religious? On the one hand, yes—
pursuing the issue from a theological frame of reference may set up an unfair power
dynamic between those who would welcome such a perspective and those who might
have something to lose by allowing it. On the other hand, to ignore such a perspective
would to be to dismiss an entire field of study long committed to the interpretation of
popular culture, emerging trends, history, sociology and more and invested in questions
of religion and non-religion—setting up an unfair power dynamic still. If religion, faith,
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institutions, culture and other similar topics continue to be subjects of debate between the
religious and non-religious, we must engage the theological voice. The voice we will
engage—that of mid-twentieth century theologian Paul Tillich—will not only provide the
non-religious reader with compelling considerations in regards to faith and meaningmaking, but will also and perhaps more dramatically, challenge the religious reader (in
particular the Christian) to reconsider their oftentimes exclusive claim on faith and
meaning-making. Primarily, by engaging with Tillich’s system of thought, we will
continue to support the principal motivation of this exploration which is to recognize and
build up the shared space where the religious and non-religious can come together in
dialogue to build relationships, learn from each other, and pursue justice together.
Paul Tillich, called a “pacific theologian” by Reinhold Niebuhr and said to have
had a “style of discussion and debate [that] was never confrontational,”1 is an ideal
candidate for consideration when exploring the issues at hand. According to Tillich
scholar and biographer Marion Pauck, “. . . his work engaged the attention of many who
had little or no relationship with either the Christian churches or with organized
religion.”2 Tillich, regarded by the religious and non-religious alike, emphasized the
importance of dialogue when encountering other religions—including what he would call
at the time the secular “quasi-religions.”
Not conversion, but dialogue. It would be a tremendous step forward if
Christianity were to accept this! It would mean that Christianity would judge itself
when it judges the others in the present encounter of the world religions… But it
would do even more. It would give a new valuation to secularism. The attack of
secularism on all present-day religions would not appear as something merely
negative . . . the secular development could be understood in a new sense, namely
1
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as the indirect way which historical destiny takes to unite mankind religiously,
and this would mean, if we include quasi-religions, also politically.3
Already, we see that Tillich not only stresses dialogue over conversion but also has an
investment in thinking seriously and not dismissively about the secular and non-religious
perspective. In addition to having a collaborative approach towards discussion about the
issues we have been exploring, Tillich’s system of thought itself—his theology—
provides us with a rich array of resources in which to think about dialogue between the
religious and non-religious. In this chapter, we will focus on four elements of Tillich’s
theology which will support our effort at creating and strengthening a shared space for
dialogue between the religious and non-religious including 1) Tillich’s definition of
“faith” as ultimate concern, 2) Tillich’s framework for the “holy” and his warning against
the “demonic,” 3) Tillich’s thoughts on “de-demonization,” and 4) Tillich’s approach to
dialogue itself. These four foci will help the Christian reader in particular think about
their faith in such a way that makes dialogue with the non-religious not only possible, but
necessary. For the non-religious reader, while Tillich’s view on secular “faith” may not
be an accepted category of identity, it can help create a better appreciation for the term.
What is more, Tillich’s theology will help the religious and non-religious alike
contemplate new points of encounter that if considered seriously, can generate an even
more intimate, shared space for dialogue, relationship-building, and the common pursuit
of justice. For Tillich, this first means coming together to take seriously the term that is
so often fraught with discord, but which can in fact be a means of connection: faith.
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Tillich’s Definition of “Faith” as Ultimate Concern—Entering into
a Common Sphere of Doubt and Courage

Faith” is not an easy word. Those who are religious take the word for granted and
believe they are the only ones that have it, and in many instances the non-religious are
happy to let them. Unfortunately, this is not a simple issue of defining terms, but a
serious question of identity that has often made dialogue between the religious and nonreligious difficult. “How”, many in the interfaith and secular realm ask, “can we include
those without faith in conversations about faith?” Responses to such a question in the
interfaith field range from ignoring the question all together and therefore inevitably
reducing the participation of the non-religious in dialogue to changing the language
around interfaith dialogue to become “inter-belief,” “multi-religious,” and or some other
term that excludes the word “faith” altogether. Such attempts to alter the language around
interfaith, however, have had mixed results. In some instances, such a change is positive
and allows and encourages a greater diversity of participation. In other instances,
previous participants become weary and fearful that by taking “faith” out of “interfaith,”
something profound has been stripped of the endeavor. What is more, by employing new
terminology it is soon discovered that there is just as much disagreement and confusion
about the acceptability of the new words as there were the old. According to Tillich,
frustration over the term “faith” is due to the “confusing and distorting connotations”
associated with the word.4 While not all religious and non-religious people will be
interested in redeeming the word, Tillich makes a strong and admirable case for
reconsideration, stressing that it need not be a word that creates division, but can in fact
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create unity. In other words, we need not rid of the term but can in fact reclaim it in such
a way that it can affirm the diverse identities of the religious and non-religious alike.
“Faith,” Tillich admits, is a term “more productive of disease than of health” in
that it “confuses, misleads, creates alternately skepticism and fanaticism, intellectual
resistance and emotional surrender, rejection of genuine religion and subjection to
substitutes.” That being said, he argues, the word cannot be done away with because
despite all its problems, a “powerful tradition protects it” and “there is as yet no substitute
expressing the reality to which [it] . . . points.”5 This reality is the “ultimate,” the
“infinite,” and all of that which is experienced as holy, sacred, good and just—whether or
not those are the words that one would choose to use to describe such experiences. Being
that there is a word that already exists that can point to this experienced reality, Tillich
argues, we need not come up with a new word but take seriously the word that is
available to us, stripping it of its negative connotations and returning to its actual
meaning.
“Faith,” Tillich is famous for saying, “is the state of being ultimately concerned . .
.”6 This state of being ultimately concerned is not monopolized by Christians or other
traditional religious identities, he says, but is the “integrating center of the personal life . .
. For this reason one cannot admit that there is any man without an ultimate concern or
without faith.”7 This means, in Tillich’s line of thought, that all people—the religious and
non-religious alike—have faith, even if the content of their faith is different. To say that
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one does not have faith, Tillich states, is to misunderstand what faith is. “The most
ordinary misinterpretation of faith is to consider it an act of knowledge that has a low
degree of evidence . . . If this is meant, one is speaking of belief rather than of faith.”8
Faith, therefore, is not belief, nor is it the will to believe. "No command to believe and no
will to believe can create faith . . . Finite man cannot produce infinite concern. Our
oscillating will cannot produce the certainty which belongs to faith . . . Neither arguments
for belief nor the will to believe can create faith.”9
Faith, therefore, is not belief or even the content of one’s belief, but is the state of
being ultimately concerned about something—which Tillich claims is a common human
experience. This is an important consideration, he says, for the religious and nonreligious alike.
If faith is understood as what it centrally is, ultimate concern, it cannot be
undercut by modern science or any kind of philosophy. And it cannot be
discredited by its superstitions or authoritarian distortions within and outside
churches, sects and movements. Faith stands upon itself and justifies itself against
those who attack it, because they can attack it only in the name of another faith. It
is the triumph of the dynamics of faith that a denial of faith is itself an expression
of faith, of an ultimate concern.10
Faith, if understood as Tillich has outlined above, could be viewed as a universally
applicable category of human experience, passion and concern that transcends any one
particular expression of that concern. This includes not only the Christian, the Hindu, the
Sikh and the Muslim and how they express the content of their ultimate concern, but also
the Humanist, the Atheist, the Skeptic and the Agnostic and how they express the content
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of their ultimate concern. “Man’s spiritual function, artistic creation, scientific
knowledge, ethical formation and political organization” Tillich states, “are consciously
or unconsciously expressions of an ultimate concern . . .”11 Tillich makes this point time
and time again, focusing here on humanism in particular:
For humanism . . . the ultimate concern of man is man . . . For this reason the
humanist faith is called “secular,” . . . Secular means belonging to the ordinary
process of events, not going beside it or beyond it into a sanctuary. In Latin and
some derived languages one speaks of profanity in the sense of “being before the
doors of the temple.” Profane in this sense is the same as secular. Often people
say that they are secular, that they live outside the doors of the temple, and
consequently that they are without faith! But if one asks them whether they are
without an ultimate concern, without something which they take as
unconditionally serious, they would strongly deny this. And in denying that they
are without an ultimate concern, they affirm that they are in a state of faith. They
represent the humanist type of faith which itself is full of varieties; the fact that
they are secular does not exclude them from the community of the faithful.12
Obviously, to make such a statement—that all people have faith—requires a great deal of
buy-in in order to be constructive in a dialogue setting. It requires the religious person to
let go of the idea that she owns faith and requires the non-religious person to claim
ownership of a term that she has perhaps deliberately rejected. If all parties can accept the
meaning behind the word ( i.e., ultimate concern), however, we can move even more
intentionally into a shared space in which meaning-making isn’t coopted by the religious
but can be pursued by all participants under a common human framework.
To make meaning of our ultimate concern, Tillich writes, is an act of love for “faith as
the state of being ultimately concerned implies love, namely, the desire and urge toward
the reunion of the separated . . . Love is present, even if hidden, in a human being; for
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every human being is longing for union with the content of his ultimate concern.”13 Each
will have one’s own particular expression of ultimate concern and one’s own content of
concern—whether it be Jesus, Allah, Buddha, Justice, Community, Progress, or so on. In
other words, one need not let go of one’s existential, ethical, philosophical, or religious
identity or priorities in order to simultaneously work from a common category of human
experience—which is the state of being ultimately concerned, or faith. To make this step
certainly requires great humility and courage from the religious and non-religious alike,
and will not exclude the possibility of great doubt as well.
Tillich affirms the risk involved in this process, remarking that in our pursuit to
make sense of our experiences in relation to reality and our ultimate concern, doubt will
play an important part. “Existential doubt and faith are poles of the same reality, the state
of ultimate concern,” he says, “But serious doubt is confirmation of faith. It indicates the
seriousness of the concern, its unconditional character.”14 Doubt is an inevitable element
of faith and having it does not exclude one from the “community of the faithful.” This
element of faith, like meaning-making, can be acknowledged by the religious and nonreligious alike in such a way that does not judge, but validates the doubts and questions
we all have—many of them the same. This requires courage, not repression Tillich
insists:
Courage does not deny that there is doubt, but it takes the doubt into itself as an
expression of its own finitude and affirms the content of an ultimate concern.
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Courage does not need the safety of an unquestionable conviction. It includes the
risk without which no creative life is possible.15
When we enter into the common sphere of faith, therefore, we enter not only into a
shared space of meaning-making, but also one of risk-taking, doubt and courage as well.
To embrace the category of faith universally for the religious and non-religious
undoubtedly has its complications and risks for all involved—and yet, to do so allows us
to gain so much more than we think it is we might lose. We can call it faith as Tillich
would insist we do, or call it ultimate concern or something else if absolutely
necessary—what is important is that we enter this space together and take seriously each
other’s experiences, doubts, and questions as we also begin to learn of the different
contents of each other’s ultimate concern. To embrace this common human category
together “levels the playing field” and gives all involved a safe and constructive space in
which to do this work. The benefit of calling this realm by the same name ( i.e., faith), is
that we can move beyond the technical wording of what it is we call it and actually move
forward with dialogue, relationship-building, and the pursuit of justice. To continue to
battle over the word, while there are legitimate reasons for doing so, may cause a delay or
worse an impediment to dialogue period. Whether or not we all agree with the label for
this common pursuit, we must at least begin to form a shared understanding of what it is
we are trying to do together and affirm the shared human drive we all have to make
meaning of our lives. It is from this point, Tillich states, that we can begin to dialogue
and not only appreciate the various religious and non-religious symbols that point to our

15

Ibid., 117-118.

59

ultimate concern, but can also begin to think critically about how those symbols can end
up becoming idols and threaten the pursuit of what is truly ultimate, just, and good.
Tillich’s Framework for the Holy and Warning against the Demonic—Naming and
Claiming our Symbols and Idols
Once the religious and non-religious have established a common space in which
all are welcome and encouraged to share what it is that ultimately concerns them, they
can begin to seriously consider the content of each other’s ultimate concerns. In Tillich’s
terminology, one can begin to really appreciate the symbols, myths and rituals that point
to what is ultimate, holy, infinite, just and good. One difficulty that often faces the
religious and non-religious seeking to dialogue is the uncritical and artificial awareness of
each other’s symbols. Even the most sincere and well-meaning interlocutors struggle to
overcome their simple and narrow regard for the other’s symbols. Statements like “Jesus
is just a first-century dead guy,” “science is just God’s way of testing our faith,” “the
Bible is just a book of fairytales,” or “Atheism is just a license for apathy” abound,
sometimes leading to deeper conversation but more often than not shutting down the
conversation all together. What’s more, Tillich remarks, there is a great misunderstanding
of what symbols actually are and do and a lack of proper identification of them. To call
“God” a symbol can be confusing for a Christian and claiming profound “holy”
significance for any sort of symbol may seem inappropriate to a non-religious person.
Tillich warns that the danger of not naming a symbol for what it is, however, is that it
threatens to become idolatrous and demonic ( i.e., absolutist), and therefore unable to
accommodate other realities that may also point to ultimate concern, holiness, justice,
goodness, etc. By considering Tillich’s approach to symbols and the concepts that
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surround them, we can continue to build a common space of dialogue whose structure is
better understood by all participants, making it easier for us to appreciate the value of
each other’s symbols and also more self-aware of how are own symbols can become
problematic.
A symbol, according to Tillich, is a finite object or concept ( i.e., something that
physically exists in empirically-verified reality) that points to an infinite reality ( i.e.,
something that is experienced as real but transcends our physical surroundings).16 “Love”
for example, is the linguistic symbol—all language being symbolic—that describes an
experience that transcends the word itself and all other symbols that might attempt to do
the same ( i.e., the image of a heart, the giving of a ring, the story of the Roman god
Cupid, etc.) Being that we are finite beings, living in a finite world, we must use symbols
to point to that which we experience as infinite, though it is important to note that these
symbols themselves are not infinite. The infinite reality to which a symbol points is
ultimate concern as described previously—or what Tillich likes to refer to as the holy. In
Tillich’s system of thought, to say that something is holy is to say that it has the quality
“of that which concerns man ultimately.”17 To call something holy in this context,
therefore, need not assume religious connotation. That which is holy, as has already been
emphasized, can only become comprehensible to us through “holy ‘objects’”—symbols,
myths, rituals, etc.18 For Christians, for example, God as an ultimate concern and infinite
reality is called holy. The proper name “God,” however, is still a symbol. “That which is
16
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the true ultimate transcends the realm of finite reality infinitely,” Tillich writes,
“Therefore, no finite reality can express it directly and properly. Religiously speaking,
God transcends his own name.”19 The moment we begin to describe those things which
transcend the finite— i.e., justice, love, God, Dharma, goodness, etc.—we are speaking
in symbols.
Similarly, when we begin to speak about “holy events,”— i.e., God’s action in the
world, the spread of democracy, the pursuit of justice, etc.—we are still speaking in
symbols, or more specifically, with myths. To say that these stories are myths is not to
reduce their “truthfulness” but is to in fact regard them with an honest appreciation for
the manner in which they do point to the infinite, all the while conscience that they are
told by finite beings using finite concepts, and are therefore limited and still slightly
separated from the infinite. This is a positive thing, Tillich insists, in that it still maintains
the seriousness of our sacred stories while simultaneously discouraging us from
committing ourselves to the stories over the infinite reality to which they point. It is one
thing, for example, to believe in the Genesis creation story and interpret its deeper
meanings and the reality to which it points— i.e., God’s concern for the natural world,
community and relationships, order out of chaos, etc.—and quite another thing to demand
that biblical creation stories be taught as science in public schools or tell someone they’re
going to hell because they think Adam is a metaphor and not a real person. This, Tillich
says, is the point in which symbols become idols and take on infinite significance even
though they themselves are finite. In the same regard, to say that the Bible or any other
religious texts are “just a bunch of myths” in a pejorative sense—or to mean that they are
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“untrue”—is just a great a misunderstanding of what they are attempting to do than is a
literal reading of the stories. Tillich, ready to call a symbol and a myth for what they are,
also stresses the importance of recognizing the great undertaking being done to point to
that which is ultimate, true, and infinite. “Myths are symbols of faith combined in stories
about divine-human encounters”20 he says, and
All mythological elements in the Bible, and doctrine and liturgy should be
recognized as mythological, but they should be maintained in their symbolic form
and not be replaced by scientific substitutes. For there is no substitute for the use
of symbols and myths: they are the language of faith.21
We’d do well, therefore, to regard such stories—ours and those of others—with critical
respect and humility. Also, by calling “God” or the “Bible” or “democracy” or “justice”
symbols, we do not claim that they are insignificant, but very important indeed. It is a
symbol that “opens up levels of reality which otherwise are closed for us.”22 It is
symbols, in other words, that connect us to the life of the infinite, to the content of our
ultimate concern.
It is here that we make a very important point about symbols themselves: we
could not have them if we did not have what we call the “secular world.” If the nonreligious are asked to contemplate calling that which concerns them ultimately as “holy,”
then the religious must take into consideration the fact that everything we use to describe
the holy is by default “secular” even if it does eventually take on holy meaning. Tillich
emphasizes this point:
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The holy embraces itself and the secular . . . Everything secular is implicitly
related to the holy. It can become the bearer of the holy. The divine can become
manifest in it. Nothing is essentially and inescapably secular . . . Everything
secular is potentially sacred, open to consecration . . . Furthermore, the holy needs
to be expressed and can be expressed only through the secular, for it is through
the finite alone that the infinite can express itself. It is through holy ‘objects’ that
holiness must become actual. The holy cannot appear except through that which
in another respect is secular. In its essential nature the holy does not constitute a
special realm in addition to the secular . . .”23
Peace, the Cross, freedom, America, and other such concepts, are or were at one point,
secular symbols. To state the point is not to belittle these symbols but to encourage us to
both appreciate the ultimate reality to which they point and also prevent us from claiming
that they themselves are ultimate. “The human heart seeks the infinite because that is
where the finite wants to rest. In the infinite it sees its own fulfillment” writes Tillich. We
are thus attracted to all that which manifests the ultimate, but in doing so, come to
recognize “the infinite distance of the finite from the infinite and, consequently, the
negative judgment over any finite attempts to reach the infinite.”24 Unfortunately, such a
realization does not always prevent us from trying to do so. This is where Tillich begins
to warn us of the absolutist nature that our symbols can take on when they themselves
claim ultimacy instead of just pointing to that which is ultimate.
Being that faith—i.e., ultimate concern—expresses itself concretely in symbols,
there is always a risk that we will mistake our symbols for that to which our symbols
point. This is, in the words of Tillich, idolatry and the point at which our symbols become
demonic. When Tillich claims that something has become demonic, he is not referring to
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the possession of evil spirits, but is saying that something has claimed ultimacy which is
not truly ultimate.
Innumerable things, all things in a way, have the power of becoming holy in a
mediate sense. They can point to something beyond themselves. But, if their
holiness comes to be considered inherent, it becomes demonic. This happens
continually in the actual life of most religions. The representations of man’s
ultimate concern—holy objects—tend to become his ultimate concern. They are
transformed into idols.25
Such a threat presents itself when one becomes unconditionally devoted to a symbol
instead of that to which the symbol points. Such instances include, for example, the fight
to recognize Christmas in the public square instead of spending the holiday to appreciate
the humanity and vulnerability of Jesus the Christ, to idealize American democracy and
patriotism over the humanitarian needs of outsiders, to mercilessly defend a particular
idea of marriage at the expense of others’ livelihood, to prioritize the separation of church
and state to a point that stifles religious and spiritual expression of any kind, and so on.
What happens, says Tillich, is that the “one expression of the ultimate denies all other
expressions. It becomes—almost inevitably—idolatrous and demonic.”26 Such absolutism
is rampant not only in religious communities, but non-religious ones as well and is an
obvious impediment to peaceful relationships.
An idolatrous faith which gives ultimacy to a preliminary concern stands against
all other preliminary concerns and excludes love relations between the
representatives of contrasting claims. The fanatic cannot love that against which
his fanaticism is directed. And idolatrous faith is by necessity fanatical. It must
repress the doubts which characterize the elevation of something preliminary to
ultimacy.27

25

Tillich, Systematic Theology: Volume One, 216.

26

Tillich, Dynamics of Faith, 142.

27

Ibid., 133.

65

Idolatry—or the demonization of our symbols—therefore, is a major danger and obstacle
to efforts to dialogue between the religious and non-religious. It creates intolerance,
ignorance, and even violence. This can be prevented, however, through dialogue itself
when a space is created to name and claim our symbols and idols.
To name and claim our symbols and idols for each other would obviously be
problematic—though such an opportunity may be appropriate in certain contexts as we
will soon see. Naming and claiming our very own symbols and idols, admitting period
that we have them, is already a significant step. By doing so, we are not only able to
identify for ourselves and others that which is most important to us, but we are also
publicly able to admit that the symbols, stories, and rituals that we use to describe the
content of our ultimate concern are themselves limited. To confess such fragility is a risk,
of course, but one that lends itself much more constructively to dialogue than does the
sort of haughty self-assurance that ignores reality and the experiences of others. To name
and claim our symbols and idols, for the religious and non-religious alike, is to enter into
the common sphere of meaning-making, risk-taking, doubt and courage described in the
previous section. By entering this space together, we open ourselves up to genuine
listening, learning, and a commitment to that which is truly ultimate, good, and just. As
we begin this process of sharing with each other our symbols and idols, we create an
environment of greater vulnerability and trust that allows us to enter into even deeper
conversation. It is at this point that we can do the hard work of self-critique and dedemonization that Tillich says is made particularly possible through dialogue between the
religious and non-religious.
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Tillich’s Thoughts on De-demonization—Implementing Secular
and Christian Forms of Critique
We are reminded that Tillich, as quoted in the beginning of this exploration,
stressed the importance of dialogue over conversion between the religious and nonreligious, an endeavor that he said would help Christianity “judge itself,” would “give
new valuation to secularism,” and would perceive the attack on religion that comes out of
the secular sphere not “as something merely negative.”28 This is because Tillich believed
that the secular sphere and non-religious perspectives provide an invaluable critique of
religion that can help Christians and other religious folk “de-demonize” their idolatrous
symbols by leading them to recognize the way in which their finite symbols have taken
on infinite status. This process, of course, goes the other way around as well. While the
religious have a great deal to benefit from the non-religious critique, so too are the nonreligious asked to identify and “de-demonize” their own idolatrous symbols. For
Christians, Tillich points out, it is the self-negating symbol of the Cross of Christ in
particular that provides the standard by which Christians are to critique other religious
and non-religious faiths, including its own. Obviously, in order to reach this point in
which such critiques can be employed, the religious and non-religious need to have
established a safe space in which they are able to receive them. By previously naming
and claiming our own symbols and idols, such a space of vulnerability has already begun
to take shape. All the while, it is important when embarking on this difficult endeavor,
that we reestablish a commitment to pursue what is truly ultimate together, accepting
from the beginning that the expressions and manifestations of ultimate concern will

28

Tillich, Christianity and the Encounter of . . . 61.

67

inevitably vary. In the end, Tillich suggests we all hold each other to the same question:
do the mediums through which we experience ultimate concern truly express what is
ultimate?29
The secular or “non-religious” contribution that Tillich finds most fruitful for
dialogue between the religious and non-religious is reason and rationalism. It is through
reason and an understanding of our finite world that we are even able to express that
which we experience as infinite. “A faith which destroys reason destroys itself and the
humanity of man,” Tillich states, for it is only with reason that we are “able to be
ultimately concerned, to distinguish ultimate and preliminary concerns, to understand the
unconditional commands of the ethical imperative, and to be aware of the presence of the
holy.”30 This is an important point to make, especially for the religious who sometimes
relegate reason and rationalism to a lower level of importance when compared to say
“faith” understood in its improper definition as “belief in the unseen.” What Tillich wants
to stress, an important reminder provided by the secular mindset in particular, is that we
can only experience that which we call holy, finite, God, etc. through the finite, secular
world.
Our symbols, rituals, doctrines, and texts, must never be viewed as ultimate in and
of themselves even if they do point to that which is ultimate. That is why, when our
symbols threaten to become demonic, we depend on the secular critique to remind us of
their finiteness. “The holy is not only open to demonization . . . But the holy is also open
to secularization. And these two, demonization and secularization, are related to each
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other insofar as secularization is the . . . most radical form of de-demonization.”31 Tillich
describes this process of secular de-demonization further:
The secular is the rational, and the rational must judge the irrationality of the
Holy. It must judge its demonization . . . The consecration of life which the Holy
gives is at the same time the domination of life by the ecstatic forms of the Holy
and the repression of the intrinsic demands of goodness, of justice, of truth and
beauty. Secularization occurring in such a context is liberation...32
The secular critique, therefore, challenges the religious to check their symbols when they
reach a point of claiming an ultimate status that they do not and cannot have. What’s
more, it humbles the religious into considering the ways in which they have allowed their
symbols to take precedence over that which is truly ultimate and holy, such as goodness
and justice—recalling Jesus’ own accusation of the religious leaders of his time when
they prioritized rites and rituals over the weightier matters of “justice and mercy and
faith”. (Mt. 23:23) Christians today are equally guilty, fighting for the proliferation of
things like the Bible, the Ten Commandments, Christmas music, and Creation
curriculums in the public square for the sake of establishing the power and presence of
these symbols themselves, thus idolizing them. When they are berated by religious and
non-religious voices alike, a legitimate criticism is raised concerning the manner in which
these symbols have taken on demonic forms. “Our traditions, scriptures, teachers and
authorities are certainly important—if it were not for them “our world would be infinitely
smaller than it actually is,”33 writes Tillich, and yet we are not to have “faith” in them.
The Christian may believe the Biblical writers, but not unconditionally. He does
not have faith in them. He should not even have faith in the Bible. For faith is
31

Tillich, Christianity and the Encounter of . . ., 73-74.

32

Ibid., 74.

33

Tillich, Dynamics of Faith, 37.

69

more than trust in even the most sacred authority. It is participation in the subject
of one’s ultimate concern with one’s whole being.34
Instead, stemming from a common point of criticism made by the non-religious,
Christians should start living the faith they say they have instead of working so ardently
to promote their symbols in a competition of power and prestige. In other words, they
should prioritize the ultimate concerns to which their symbols point like justice, right
relationships, forgiveness, charity, and more. They need not give up their symbols, but
they must not idolize them either.
Such a critique, of course, can be used by both the religious and non-religious
alike. Tillich says that is why it is so important that the non-religious also name and claim
their own symbols and idols as they too are at risk of becoming demonic. Such was and is
the case, Tillich claims, with the “nationalist quasi-religions” of Nazism and modern
American patriotism,35 whose symbols drown out competing ideas and ignore other
expressions of ultimate concern, or with an absolutist scientific approach that confuses
dimensions of meaning by trying to debunk faith with science.36 Fanaticism and
radicalism, Tillich points out, while often religious, can take on secular forms as well and
prove to be just as oppressive as the “demonic elements of the religions.”37 For
Christians, the tool of critique with which such absolutism can be judged—in both the
religious and non-religious realms—is situated in its most valued symbol, the Cross of
Christ.
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The Cross is a complicated and loaded symbol that has taken on a great number of
meanings over the centuries. In its most humble form, it points to a Christian’s ultimate
concern for things like grace, love, and redemption and inspires a passion for justice and
mercy. In its most demonic form, the symbol of the Cross has been used to conquer and
destroy lands and cultures, force conversion, and murder. To approach it as the criterion
through which a Christian judges itself and others is fraught with complexity and an
expected weariness on the part of those who it has harmed. Tillich hopes, however, to
redeem this symbol in the same way he worked to redeem the true meaning of faith and
symbols themselves. To fight against idolatry and the demonic, Tillich says, faith needs
“an element of self-negation” that prevents symbols from claiming absolute status. Being
that faith is expressed and lived out through symbols, however, we must find a symbol
that can do the double-duty of both pointing to the ultimate and “its own lack of
ultimacy.”`
Christianity expresses itself is such a symbol . . . namely, in the Cross of the
Christ. Jesus could not have been the Christ without sacrificing himself as Jesus to
himself as the Christ. Any acceptance of Jesus as the Christ which is not the
acceptance of Jesus the crucified is a form of idolatry. The ultimate concern of the
Christian faith is not Jesus, but the Christ Jesus who is manifest as the crucified.
The event which has created this symbol has given the criterion by which the truth
of Christianity, as well as of any other religion, must be judged.38
That means, a symbol—even Jesus himself—is not to assert itself but is to give itself up
for the sake of ultimacy. This is a dramatic proposition, but in Tillich’s mind, absolutely
necessary if one’s symbols are to truly point to the content of one’s ultimate concern. For
the Christian, this is best done in the Cross of Christ. What’s more, this example gives the
Christian the criterion through which to judge all other symbols—its own and others’.
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This criterion is established in the event of the Crucifixion of Jesus on the Cross which
first produced the symbol:
The meaning of this event shows not in its providing a foundation for a new
religion with a particular character (though this followed, unavoidably, with
consequences partly creative and partly destructive, ambiguously mixed in church
history), but it shows in the event itself, which preceded and judges these
consequences. It is a personal life, the image of which, as it impressed itself on his
followers, shows no break on his relation to God and no claim for himself in his
particularity. What is particular in him is that he crucified the particular in himself
for the sake of the universal. This liberates his image from bondage both to a
particular religion—the religion to which he belonged has thrown him out—and
to the religious sphere as such; the principle of love in him embraces the cosmos,
including both the religions and the secular spheres. With this image, particular
yet free from particularity, religious yet free from religion, the criteria are given
under which Christianity must judge itself and, by judging itself, judge also the
other religions and the quasi-religions.39
When dialoguing with the religious and non-religious, therefore, the Christian can lend
the critique produced by consideration of the Cross, asking questions like “does this
symbol point to the truly ultimate . . . is this symbol willing to negate itself for the sake of
that to which it points . . . does this symbol embrace the cosmos, the religious and the
secular?” These are questions that can be asked by the religious and non-religious alike
and help both reflect deeply on their symbols and consider whether or not these symbols
have the ability to give over their own power for the sake of the ultimate concern to
which they point. While it is a Christian symbol—the Cross of Christ—that provides this
criterion, such a critique is still a valuable and worthwhile one to employ for both the
religious and non-religious alike. It is when we allow this self-criticism that we are more
likely to express that which is truly ultimate. This keeps our communities from becoming
static, Tillich states
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. . . creedal expressions of the ultimate concern of the community must include
their own criticism. It must become obvious in all of them—be they liturgical,
doctrinal or ethical expressions of the faith of the community—that they are not
ultimate. Rather, their function is to point to the ultimate which is beyond all of
them.40
The Cross of Christ is one such tool of self-criticism. Paired with the secular critique of
reason and rationalism, religious and non-religious participants in dialogue have a rich
base of resources in which to consider their symbols and avoid the type of absolutism that
disregards other expressions of ultimate concern.
As was stated before, to apply these critiques during dialogue is no easy task and
demands that we continue to occupy a common space of doubt and courage. Fortunately,
this can be done in such a way that there is no one party that takes the upper-hand
because both the religious and non-religious have tools to share and ways to benefit from
their use. No one intends for their symbols to become demonic, but the reality is that they
do. When they do, the fact often goes unrecognized—especially when we are not in
dialogue with those who might help us make that realization. If we are only ever in
conversation with those who have also succumbed to idolizing the symbols we hold dear,
we risk becoming unfaithful to the actual ultimate concerns to which we had hoped to be
committed in the first place. By dialoguing with diverse perspectives, we are gifted with a
special opportunity to re-commit ourselves to that which truly moves and grasps us as we
become reacquainted with our symbols and wrestle them away from their demonic forms.
We do this by taking seriously each other’s symbols and tools of critique and with an
attitude that is conducive to learning and relationship-building. This brings us to our final
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consideration of Tillich’s theology and one more contribution he has to make to dialogue
between the religious and non-religious: his approach to dialogue itself.
Tillich’s Approach to Dialogue—Adopting Constructive
Attitudes for the Sake of the Truly Ultimate

In an impressive effort to organize Tillich’s thoughts on dialogue for easy-use by
the general public, Robison B. James endeavors to synthesize and package a Tillichian
approach to dialogue in his book Tillich and World Religions: Encountering Other Faiths
Today. This thoughtful piece of writing presents Tillich’s theology and translates it into a
practical and functional guide for engaging in dialogue between diverse perspectives—
making it incredibly useful for our purposes here. Now that we have already established
some of the principal concepts in Tillich’s thought that can be helpful for dialogue
between the religious and non-religious— i.e., the meaning of faith, symbols, and the
demonic the secular critique of reason and rationalism and the Christian critique of the
Cross of Christ—we will finally consider Tillich’s approach to dialogue itself, one that
will prove to be extremely relevant and fruitful for the type of common space of
meaning-making, doubt and courage that we have been working to create. Taking directly
from the work of Tillich, Robison presents us with three attitudes in which we can enter
into dialogue between diverse and differing beliefs: contextual pluralism, reciprocal
inclusivism, and contextual exclusivism. Before taking note of these approaches to
dialogue, however, it is important to first consider Tillich’s identification of the three
“levels of experience” in which one might encounter a belief or worldview different from
one’s own.
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According to Tillich, there are three different levels that we experience our own
faiths and engage with those of others. The first is a more “theoretical and detached”41
level at which an objective, empirical, and “controlling knowledge” is gained through the
experience.42 This would take place, for example, in a scholarly or academic setting when
learning about other belief systems, while reading a book, listening to a lecture, or
watching a documentary. At this level, one obtains information but may or may not
integrate such information into one’s personal belief system or set of values.43 The
second level of experience is less theoretical and detached and more invested in gaining
“empathy, insight, and understanding.”44 At this level, one is more likely to gain the sort
of knowledge that one will integrate into one’s personal belief system and set of values,
or will at least consider and judge them based on what it is one already believes and
values. In the words of James, this level “is the depth in which we understand and
interpret the manifold expressions of the human spirit, in the arts, in scientific projects, in
mastering and using a language, in social movements, in political causes,” etc.45 Finally,
in the third level of experience, one is “profoundly, existentially, and life-shapingly
involved” in what one is experiencing.46 This is the level at which one makes decisions
about what one believes and values, the point at which one is totally “wrapped up” and
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“grasped” by something. This is “existential knowledge,” or religious or spiritual
knowledge, in which we have an “awareness of values, causes, imperatives, and realities
that shape and determine who and what we are in our deepest selves.”47 It is at this level
of experience, in fact, that one is grasped by or accepts the symbols that point to one’s
ultimate concern, or on the other hand, rejects those symbols that are unable to do so. It is
at these three levels of experience that the religious and non-religious might encounter
each other depending on the context—they might, for example, learn of each other’s
belief systems and worldviews in the classroom (level-one), engage in conversation
together at an interfaith dialogue event (level-two), or sit down one-on-one for an indepth consideration of deep, existential questions (level-three). Depending on which level
of experience one is engaged can affect the type of attitude one might employ in that
context.
Attitude, as used above, describes the approach one might take to engage another
person, idea, or perspective that is different from one’s own. Typically, James writes, we
are presented with three options: a pluralist attitude, and inclusivist attitude, and an
exclusivist attitude.
If we adopt a “pluralist” attitude, we say that each of the plural world religions
possesses religious or transforming truth that is just as valid, effective, and
valuable as any of the others . . . If we adopt an “inclusivist” attitude, we say that
the standard for all saving truth is given in “my” religion, but other religions
include more or less of that truth and power . . . If we adopt an “exclusivist”
attitude, we say that religious or saving truth is found exclusively in our own
religion.48
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Tillich, however, provides us with three variations of these possibilities which James
believes are more appropriate for dialogue: contextual pluralism, reciprocal inclusivism,
and contextual exclusivism. One may engage each attitude at different times or multiple
attitudes at one time,49 though we may “feel more at home in one of them” and end up
adopting it as a “baseline attitude.”50 At Tillich’s first, detached level of experience,
James recommends contextual pluralism as the best attitude to take.
Contextual pluralism is the manner in which one adopts a pluralist attitude only in
certain contexts—in this case level-one objective experiences.51 According to James,
Tillich was himself a contextual pluralist:
He recognized deep structural, thematic, and substantive commonalities between
Christian faith and other religions, and is sharply critical of efforts to present a
theology of the history of religions that fails to affirm divine revelation in all
religious experience . . . 52
In other words, Tillich was able to affirm “both the truth of salvation, and its saving or
transforming power, in all religion.”53 This means that when we are presented with the
opportunity to learn about each other’s beliefs and worldviews—religious or nonreligious—we can go about the exercise in such a way that we respect and affirm the
value and saving affect that the others’ symbols, stories, rituals, and creeds have on their
lives. This does not mean we must adopt these symbols for ourselves, but accept with
seriousness the fact that these symbols have a profound impact on others. This is
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especially needed when entering the sort of common space we have been setting up
throughout this chapter where dialogue participants are asked to be vulnerable and trust
their counterparts. Adopting a contextual pluralist attitude strengthens this space and
makes it more conducive to sharing and learning. As is obvious in any conversation of
worth, however, we recognize that the content of the encounter can deepen in nature and
thus thrust us into the second level of experience in which we seek to really understand
each other’s symbols.
At level-two empathy-building experiences, James strongly insists that we adopt
what Tillich best exemplified in his own life and work: reciprocal inclusivism. Like
Tillich’s encounter with Buddhism in 1960, it is during more intentional conversations
between diverse perspectives— i.e., those found in interfaith dialogues—that “we find
ourselves entering empathetically into life forms, sometimes even into strange life forms .
. . and they enter partially into us. The result is that we live partly in them, while they live
at least a tiny part of their life in us.”54 It is this point of dialogue that the participants
begin to not only objectively affirm the symbols of others, but to wonder and seriously
consider how these symbols might operate in their own belief and value systems.
When we detect these similar or analogous elements, we begin to understand how
the transforming truth that grasps us in our faith is making itself felt—with what
degree of clarity and strength we may not be sure—in the faith of the other
person, also . . . we sense in the other tradition some of the religious power and
truth that, for us, are normatively present in our own religious tradition.55
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In other words, we not only consider how others’ symbols work in our system of
meaning, but allow others to consider how our own symbols might work in their own
system.
To be an inclusivist is to affirm something about other faiths in this pattern: their
saving truth is included in, but also judged by the saving truth in my religion. To
be a reciprocal inclusivist is to go beyond that affirmation in such a way that we
expect that the representatives of other faiths will have the same inclusivist
attitude toward our faith, and also—here is the trademark feature—to approve the
fact that these other parties adopt an inclusivist attitude toward our faith, and to
approve this fact even when the other parties’ inclusivism entail their judging our
faith.56
This is the sort of dialogue we move into when we begin to appreciate and judge each
other’s symbols without necessarily giving up our own—when we utilize, for example,
the secular critiques of reason and rationalism and the Christian critique of the Cross of
Christ that were exhibited earlier for considering our own symbols and idols and those of
others. This is, as has been pointed out several times already, an action of risk that may
involve a great deal of doubt and courage. Embracing this task, however, and entering
into a level-two encounter with other perspectives, is what keeps us focused on what is
truly ultimate, infinite, good and just. We are forced to articulate ourselves, describe how
it is our symbols point to ultimacy, and redeem our symbols from their demonic forms. It
is with a reciprocal inclusivist attitude that this is best achieved and made possible, and is
why James recommends it as the best “baseline attitude” one might take in dialogue
situations.57 By taking this approach, we strengthen the common space we have built
together and allow for the possibility of real growth in ourselves and others in that our
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expressions of faith may take into themselves new expressions of ultimate concern, stay
the same but become more coherent, and/or be judged by our own faith and that of others
to the benefit of giving us a more mature faith.
It is with a more mature faith and firm establishment of trust between dialogue
partners that the opportunity for level-three, existential experiences are more likely to
occur. While we learn new information at level-one experiences and understand and
empathize with that information at level-two experiences, at level-three experiences we
respond to existential questions fully from our own perspective, most likely utilizing an
approach of contextual exclusivism. According to James, a contextual exclusivist has
three traits:
The person’s baseline attitude in interreligious encounters in not exclusivist . . . It
is only in certain contexts, and in encounters of considerable depth, that this
person gives relatively free rein to an exclusivist tendency . . . And . . . the
contextual exclusivist can conceive the possibility that, in other contexts—
contexts besides the ones that evoke an exclusivist response in them—another
faith besides their own might serve as the vehicle of ultimate fulfillment, or as the
vehicle of some measure of such fulfillment.58
To be “exclusivist” at an existential level, therefore, does not require one to be an
exclusivist at all times or to adopt it as one’s baseline attitude. In certain, contexts,
however, such an approach may be the most honest and appropriate. This happens when
we come across those moments when we are called in a more intentional way to speak
genuinely and completely out of our own faith as individuals.
At this level, we are grasped by reality at its deepest and most embracing. At this
depth the ground of our being and the ground of all meaning get at us through
religious symbols . . . In and through these realities we are grasped at a level
beyond the level at which these realities are simply objects for us as subjects.
“Who we are” and “how we shall live” are so tied up with these realities that it
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would be a preposterous trivialization to think that we could swap one of them for
another.59
In other words, when asked to really account for what it is we believe and what it is that
heals us, drives us, “saves” us, “ we will not be able to affirm salvation or ultimate
fulfillment within the symbolism of any other religion than the one in whose beneficent
grip we sense ourselves then to be.”60 The Christian will have to speak from Christian
symbols, an Atheist through Atheist symbols, a Humanist through Humanist symbols,
and so on. So, when previously we asked the religious and non-religious alike to consider
using the Cross of Christ as an example criterion for judging symbols, we were operating
at a level-two encounter in which such a possibility exists. At a level-three encounter, it
would be impossible for anyone but a Christian to speak personally and existentially
about how the Cross of Christ operates as a saving power in their lives. They could not,
when asked to make an existential decision, use anything but their own symbols to
respond. In this context, one would have to take on an exclusivist approach, but unlike
the other approaches, not as an attitude per say. James prefers to call this sort of
exclusivism a tendency instead because it “is something we feel, or something we are
moved by, whereas exclusivism is an attitude in the sense of a stance or a position that we
adopt.”61 Also, it is contextual, and is not the sort of approach one wants to take as one’s
“baseline attitude” if their aim to engage in the sort of dialogue that produces growth and
seeks the truly ultimate. While this is the sort of approach that will likely occur less often,
it still works like the other approaches to strengthen the common space of dialogue
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between the religious and non-religious because it grants all involved with the permission
to be their authentic selves when asked to answer questions of great depth. It creates the
sort of environment in which one feels safe to share what matters most to her, even when
it disagrees profoundly with other perspectives, and expects that others will feel the same
way.
As can be seen, Tillich’s approach to dialogue itself—like his ideas on faith,
symbols, and the demonic and religious and non-religious forms of self-critique—
contributes positively to efforts to dialogue between the religious and non-religious. His
practice of contextual pluralism, reciprocal inclusivism, and contextual exclusivism in his
own life and theology provide us with helpful and practical ways to go about learning
about each other’s systems of belief and worldviews, understanding more intentionally
the symbols that make up those other faiths as included and judged by our own faiths,
and speaking honestly and completely about how our own faiths move, heal and save us.
Like all practical propositions that are made to improve the state of things, Paul
Tillich’s contributions towards dialogue between the religious and non-religious will
have to be tested in reality before their application can be judged. Already tested in his
own lifetime, Paul Tillich earned a credible and positive reputation with those in and
outside of religion with his theological system and approach towards dialogue. While
much has changed in religious and non-religious life since the passing of Tillich in 1965,
his ideas can and will continue to influence present life. In the realm of interfaith
dialogue—Tillich’s system of thought can be of particular service to endeavors to
integrate the participation of those who identify as “non-religious” such as atheists,
humanists, agnostics, skeptics and freethinkers. By redeeming the meaning of faith and
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symbols, Tillich has provided us with the categories needed to regard each other’s faiths,
worldviews, and perspectives with equal regard—whether they be religiously rooted or
not. His warning against the demonic—or absolutism in more contemporary terms—
provides us with an invaluable critique of the type of both religious and non-religious
extremism that hinders dialogue in the first place. Tillich’s respect and regard for secular
and religious criticisms help us recognize the role dialogue has in our society period as it
encourages us all stay faithful to that which is truly ultimate, good and just. And finally,
Tillich’s contextualization of dialogical approaches give us the variety of methods we
need to go about dialogue between the religious and non-religious in such a way that not
only honors those with whom we disagree but allows us to be true to ourselves. If given a
chance to be considered and implemented, Tillich’s contributions could create and
strengthen an intimate, safe, and thought-provoking space of meaning-making, doubt, and
courage shared by the religious and non-religious as they build relationships, learn from
each other, and pursue justice together.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
In the above exploration we have both discovered the rich connections shared by
the religious and non-religious and have made specific propositions for strengthening
those connections. The religious and non-religious, religion and secularization, and the
sacred and secular are intimately tied together. They share a common history, interact
with each other in everyday life, and depend on each other to thrive. The religious and
non-religious, while oftentimes unaware of the fact, already occupy a common space of
encounter in which meaning-making is done and the common good is pursued. The space
for dialogue, therefore, already exists. Unfortunately, as is seen in the most publicized
venues of communication, this space is often overwhelmed by unproductive debate,
power struggles, absolutism and linguistic violence. Many dialogue proponents and
interfaith activists, however, are determined to reclaim this space and the potential the
religious and non-religious have for engaging in meaningful conversations together for
the sake of relationship-building, learning, and the common good. Reclaiming and
strengthening this space is made all the more possible by recognizing the common history
that has shaped our identities, honoring the experiences and contributions of others,
appreciating the diverse symbols and expressions of ultimate concern that give meaning
to our lives, and having the courage to embrace doubt and criticism.
The groundwork for dialogue has now been laid, here and by others advocating
for cooperation between the religious and non-religious. Now, we must move beyond the
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history, theory, and propositions and move towards a practical application of the type of
intentional dialogue space we have been promoting, where establishing trust and
vulnerability creates the environment for building relationships, where listening and
sharing opens us up to new learning, and where honesty and an openness to each other
encourages healthy forms of communication and the possibility of cooperation. This
process will neither ask anyone to disregard who they are nor will it ignore hard truths—
instead, it will allow all parties to come as they are and to speak the truth, but to do so in
such a way that is safe, respectful, and open to discovery. As religious and non-religious
people alike living in an increasingly pluralistic world that includes more and more
diversely religious and non-religious communities, there is much at stake in how we
choose to interact with each other. We can avoid and deny the common space we share,
stalling for a short time difficult conversations at the risk of being unprepared to deal
with them when they finally and inevitably to come to pass. We can enter the space with
fists flying and simplistic words of insults ready at the risk of creating more turmoil and
division. Or we can, with humility and compassion, step into the space ready to learn,
listen, share, and be changed by what we encounter there at the risk of finding out that we
actually like each other, have a great deal to contribute to each other, and are better
equipped to pursue justice and the common good when doing so together.
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